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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to relate algebraic quantum mechanics to topos theory, so
as to construct new foundations for quantum logic and quantum spaces. Motivated by
Bohr’s idea that the empirical content of quantum physics is accessible only through
classical physics, we show how a noncommutativeC*-algebra of observablesA induces a
topos T (A) in which the amalgamation of all of its commutative subalgebras comprises
a single commutative C*-algebra A. According to the constructive Gelfand duality
theorem of Banaschewski and Mulvey, the latter has an internal spectrum Σ(A) in
T (A), which in our approach plays the role of the quantum phase space of the system.
Thus we associate a locale (which is the topos-theoretical notion of a space and which
intrinsically carries the intuitionistic logical structure of a Heyting algebra) to a C*-
algebra (which is the noncommutative notion of a space). In this setting, states on
A become probability measures (more precisely, valuations) on Σ, and self-adjoint
elements of A define continuous functions (more precisely, locale maps) from Σ to
Scott’s interval domain. Noting that open subsets of Σ(A) correspond to propositions
about the system, the pairing map that assigns a (generalized) truth value to a state
and a proposition assumes an extremely simple categorical form. Formulated in this
way, the quantum theory defined by A is essentially turned into a classical theory,
internal to the topos T (A).
These results were inspired by the topos-theoretic approach to quantum physics
proposed by Butterfield and Isham, as recently generalized by Do¨ring and Isham.
Motto
‘Ces “nuages probabilistes”, remplac¸ant les rassurantes particules mate´rielles
d’antan, me rappellent e´trangement les e´lusifs “voisinages ouverts” qui pe-
uplent les topos, tels des fantoˆmes e´vanescents, pour entourer des “points”
imaginaires.’ (A. Grothendieck [42])1
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1 Introduction
This introduction is intended for both mathematical physicists and topos theorists. We
apologize in advance for stating the obvious for one or the other of these groups at various
points, but we hope that most of it is interesting to both communities.
1.1 The logic of classical physics
In classical mechanics, the logical structure of a physical system is encoded in its phase
space M . Indeed, elementary propositions (also called ‘yes-no questions’ in physics) cor-
respond to suitable subsets of M (such as all sets, all measurable sets or all regular open
sets), and the logical connectives are given by the standard set-theoretic operations. This
makes the logic of the system ‘spatial’; its realization as a Boolean algebra (i.e. a distribu-
tive lattice with 0 and 1 in which every element has a complement) confirms the ‘classical’
nature of the situation [76].
Physicists do not usually describe a system in the above way. Instead, they work with
observables a : M → R, like position or energy. (Such functions might be arbitrary, or
else required to be measurable or continuous as appropriate.) From that perspective, the
elementary propositions are of the form a ∈ ∆, where ∆ ⊆ R is a (arbitrary, measurable,
or regular open) subset of the reals.
Either way, a state of the system may be construed as a catalogue of answers to all
yes-no questions about the systems. We concentrate on pure states ρ ∈M , which provide
sharp (as opposed to probabilistic) answers. In the first description, a proposition U ⊆M
is true (equivalently, the answer to the corresponding question is ‘yes’) iff ρ ∈ U . In the
second description, a ∈ ∆ is true for a state ρ iff a(ρ) ∈ ∆, i.e. iff ρ ∈ a−1(∆). Thus
propositions of the second type fall into equivalence classes [a ∈ ∆] = a−1(∆). As these
are subsets of M , this leads us back to the purely spatial picture of the first description.
This truth assignment has a very simple categorical description. We regard M as an
object in the category Sets of all sets as objects and all functions as arrows, and interpret
ρ as an arrow (in fact, a monomorphism) 1
ρ
//M , where 1 is any singleton. A subset
U ⊆ M may alternatively be described by its characteristic function χU : M → {0, 1};
anticipating the convention in topos theory, we relabel {0, 1} as Ω and regard this as an
object in Sets. Composition of 1
ρ
//M and M
χa−1(∆)
//Ω then yields an arrow
1
〈ρ,a∈∆〉
//Ω = 1
ρ
//M
χ
a−1(∆)
//Ω, (1)
i.e. we have defined
〈ρ, a ∈ ∆〉 = χa−1(∆) ◦ ρ. (2)
The image of 1 under this map is a point of Ω, which is precisely the above truth value of
the proposition a ∈ ∆ in the state ρ (provided we identify {0, 1} with {false, true}).
It is important for what follows to reformulate this description in terms of the topol-
ogy O(M) of M (i.e. its collection of opens) instead of M itself. This makes sense if the
subsets U ⊆M above are open, which in our second description is the case if the observ-
ables a are continuous and the value sets ∆ ⊆ R are open as well. Hence a−1(∆) is an
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arrow 1
a−1(∆)
//O(M) in Sets, but ρ ∈M is now represented by the ‘state subobject’
[ρ] ⊆ O(M) given by
[ρ] = {V ∈ O(M) | ρ ∈ V } = {V ∈ O(M) | δρ(V ) = 1}, (3)
where δρ is the Dirac measure on M concentrated at ρ. We describe this object by its
characteristic function χ[ρ] : O(M)→ Ω. The pairing map then becomes
1
〈a∈∆,ρ〉
//Ω = 1
a−1(∆)
//O(M)
χ[ρ]
//Ω, (4)
or, in other words,
〈a ∈ ∆, ρ〉 = χ[ρ] ◦ a
−1(∆). (5)
The reader may verify that 〈a ∈ ∆, ρ〉 = 〈ρ, a ∈ ∆〉, so that our second categorical
description of the state-proposition pairing is equivalent to the first. More generally, if µ
is a probability measure on M , we might define a state object [µ] by replacing the Dirac
measure δρ in (3) by µ, i.e.
[µ] = {V ∈ O(M) | µ(V ) = 1}. (6)
In physics, µ plays the role of a mixed state (unless it is a point measure, in which case it
happens to be pure). Like the pure state ρ (or rather its associated probability measure
δρ), the mixed state µ defines a characteristic function χ[µ] : O(M) → Ω. The latter,
however, turns out not to share the attractive logical properties of χ[ρ] ≡ χδρ (unless µ is
pure); see Subsection 1.5.
1.2 Spatial quantum logic
The goal of this paper is to generalize this situation to quantum mechanics. In particular,
we wish to find a spatial notion of quantum logic. This objective will be accomplished by:
1. Identifying an appropriate notion of a quantum phase ‘space’ Σ.
2. Defining suitable ‘subsets’ of Σ that act as elementary logical propositions of quan-
tum mechanics.
3. Describing observables and states in terms of Σ.
4. Associating a proposition a ∈ ∆ (and hence a ‘subset’ [a ∈ ∆] of Σ) to an observable
a and an open subset ∆ ⊆ R.
5. Finding a pairing map between pure states and ‘subsets’ of Σ (and hence between
states and propositions of the type a ∈ ∆).
In the last step, a state assigns a particular truth value to a given proposition; this is
supposed to give empirical content to the formalism. The codomain Ω of the pairing map
in item 5, which may be called the ‘truth object’ of the theory, is by no means obvious
and identifying it is explicitly part of the question. Certainly, 20th century physics shows
that the ‘classical’ choice Ω = {0, 1} is out of the question.
The formulation of these objectives and the associated program goes back to von
Neumann, who also famously proposed the following extremely elegant solution:
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1. A quantum phase space is a Hilbert space H.
2. Elementary propositions correspond to closed linear subspaces of H.
3. Observables are selfadjoint operators on H and pure states are unit vectors in H.
4. The closed linear subspace [a ∈ ∆] is the image E(∆)H of the spectral projection
E(∆) defined by a and ∆ (provided the latter is measurable).
5. The pairing map takes values in [0, 1] and is given by the “Born rule” 〈Ψ, a ∈ ∆〉 =
(Ψ, E(∆)Ψ).
Thus subsets of phase space became closed linear subspaces of Hilbert space, which,
as Birkhoff and von Neumann [10] noticed, form a lattice L(H) under inclusion as partial
order. However, this lattice fails to be Boolean, basically because it is nondistributive.
Nonetheless, Birkhoff and von Neumann interpreted the lattice operations ∧ and ∨ as
‘and’ and ‘or’, as in the classical case, and argued that the departure from the Boolean
structure (and hence from classical logic) meant that one had to deal with a new kind of
logic, which they aptly called quantum logic. This looked highly innovative, but on the
other hand it conservatively preserved the spatial nature of the logic of classical physics,
in that the logical structure of propositions is still associated with the spatial (i.e. Hilbert
space) structure of the theory.
Attractive and revolutionary as this spatial quantum ‘logic’ may appear [76, 54, 55, 70],
it faces severe problems. The main logical drawbacks are:
• Due to its lack of distributivity, quantum ‘logic’ is difficult to interpret as a logical
structure.
• In particular, despite various proposals no satisfactory implication operator has been
found (so that there is no deductive system in quantum logic).
• Quantum ‘logic’ is a propositional language; no satisfactory generalization to predi-
cate logic has been found.
Quantum logic is also problematic from a physical perspective. Since (by various
theorems [14] and wide agreement) quantum probabilities do not admit an ignorance
interpretation, [0, 1]-valued truth values attributed to propositions by pure states via the
Born rule cannot be regarded as sharp (i.e. {0, 1}-valued) truth values muddled by human
ignorance. This implies that, if x = [a ∈ ∆] represents a quantum-mechanical proposition,
it is wrong to say that either x or its negation holds, but we just do not know which of
these alternatives applies. However, in quantum logic one has the law of the excluded
middle in the form x ∨ x⊥ = 1 for all x. Thus the formalism of quantum logic does not
match the probabilistic structure of quantum theory responsible for its empirical content.
In fact, the above argument suggests that it is intuitionistic logic rather than quantum
logic that is relevant in quantummechanics (cf. [4]). More generally, as argued in particular
by Butterfield and Isham [17, 20], the fact that pure states fail to define truth assignments
in the usual binary sense (i.e. true or false) renders the entire notion of truth in quantum
mechanics obscure and calls for a complete reanalysis thereof [33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. As also
probably first recognized by the same authors, such an analysis can fruitfully be attempted
using topos theory, whose internal logic is indeed intuitionistic.
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From our perspective, another reason why topos theory offers itself on a silver tray
in our search for a spatial quantum logic lies in the interplay between spatial and logical
structures inherent in topos theory, as exemplified by the opening words of the renowned
textbook by Mac Lane and Moerdijk:
A startling aspect of topos theory is that it unifies two seemingly wholly distinct
mathematical subjects: on the one hand, topology and algebraic geometry and
on the other hand, logic and set theory.
We refer to [41, 63, 50, 51] for accounts of topos theory; see also [9, 65, 57] for historical
details. Briefly, a topos is a category in which one can essentially reason as in the category
Sets of all sets (with functions as arrows), except for the fact that the logic is intuitionistic
and the axiom of choice is generally not available. Briefly, the mathematics underlying
topos theory is constructive.
Specifically, a topos is a category with the following ingredients:
1. Terminal object. This is an object called 1 (unique up to isomorphism) such that
for each object A there is a unique arrow A → 1, generalizing the singleton set in
the category Sets.
2. Pullbacks. These generalize the fibered product B ×A C = {(b, c) ∈ B × C | f(b) =
g(c)} of B
f
//A and C
g
//A in Sets into a pullback square with appropriate
universality property. Cartesian products are a special case.
3. Exponentials. These generalize the idea that the class BA of functions from a set A
to a set B is itself a set, and hence an object in Sets, equipped with the evaluation
map ev : A×BA → B.
4. Subobject classifier. This generalizes the idea that one may characterize a subset A ⊆
B by its characteristic function χA : B → {0, 1}. Subsets generalize to subobjects,
i.e. monic (“injective”) arrows A ֌ B, and in a topos there exists an object Ω
(the subobject classifier) with associated arrow 1
⊤
//Ω (“truth”) such that for any
subobject A ֌ B there is a unique arrow B
χA
//Ω for which B A
f
oo //1 is
a pullback of B
χA
//Ω and 1
⊤
//Ω. Conversely, given any arrow B
χ
//Ω there
exists a subobject A֌ B of B (unique up to isomorphism) whose classifying arrow
χB equals χ. The subobject classifier in a topos play the role of a “multi-valued truth
object”, generalizing the simple situation in Sets, where Ω = {0, 1} = {false, true});
see (2) and subsequent text.
We assume that our topoi are cocomplete and have a natural numbers object.
1.3 Generalized notions of space
Our first objective in the list at the beginning of Subsection 1.2, i.e. the identification of
an appropriate notion of a quantum phase ‘space’, will be met by a combination of two
profound notions of generalized space that have been around for some time.
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1. First, let us recall the strategy of noncommutative geometry [24, 25]. One starts
with the replacement of a compact topological space X by the associated algebra
of complex-valued continuous functions C(X,C). If X fails to be Hausdorff, this
step loses information, but if it is, one may recover X from the commutative C*-
algebra C(X,C) as its Gelfand spectrum. This yields a duality between the category
of compact Hausdorff spaces and the category of unital commutative C*-algebras:
nothing is lost, but nothing is gained either by abstracting spaces as commutative
C*-algebras. The thrust of noncommutative geometry, then, is to allow C*-algebras
to be noncommutative without losing the spatial perspective. That this can be
done is impressive enough, but as the logical situation is obscured by moving from
commutative to noncommutative C*-algebras, further ideas are needed (at least if
one is interested in quantum logic).
2. A second approach to generalizing topological spaces would be to replace X by its
topology O(X). This has a natural lattice structure under inclusion, and in fact
defines a highly structured kind of lattice known as a frame. This is a complete
distributive lattice such that x ∧
∨
λ yλ =
∨
λ x ∧ yλ for arbitrary families {yλ} (and
not just for finite ones, in which case the said property follows from the definition of
a distributive lattice). For example, if X is a topological space, then the topology
O(X) of X is a frame with U 6 V if U ⊆ V . A frame homomorphism preserves
finite meets and arbitrary joins; this leads to the category Frm of frames and frame
homomorphisms.
Abstracting frames O(X) coming from a topological space to general frames is a genuine
generalization of the concept of a space, as plenty of frames exist that are not of the form
O(X). A simple example is the frame Oreg(R) of regular open subsets of R, i.e. of open
subsets U with the property ¬¬U = U , where ¬U is the interior of the complement of U .
This may be contrasted with the situation for unital commutative C*-algebras, which, as
just recalled, are all of the form C(X). Moreover, far from obscuring the logical structure
of space, the generalization of spaces by frames rather explains and deepens this structure.
Indeed, a frame is a complete Heyting algebra, with its intrinsic structure of an in-
tuitionistic propositional logic. Here a Heyting algebra is a distributive lattice L with a
map →: L × L → L satisfying x 6 (y → z) iff x ∧ y 6 z, called implication [41, 63, 80].
Every Boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra, but not vice versa; in fact, a Heyting algebra
is Boolean iff ¬¬x = x for all x, which is the case iff ¬x ∨ x = ⊤ for all x. Here negation
is a derived notion, defined by ¬x = (x→⊥). For example, Oreg(R) is Boolean, but O(R)
is not. In general, the elements of a Heyting algebra form an intuitionistic propositional
logic under the usual logical interpretation of the lattice operations.
A Heyting algebra is complete when arbitrary joins (i.e. sups) and meets (i.e. infs)
exist. A complete Heyting algebra is essentially the same thing as a frame, for in a frame
one may define y → z =
∨
{x | x ∧ y 6 z}. Conversely, the infinite distributivity law in
a frame is automatically satisfied in a Heyting algebra. The set of subobjects of a given
object in a topos forms a complete Heyting algebra (as long as the topos in question is
defined “internal to Sets”), generalizing the fact that the set of subsets of a given set is
a Boolean algebra. The subobject classifier of such a topos is a complete Heyting algebra
as well; in fact, these two statements are equivalent. (Note, however, frame maps do
not necessarily preserve the implication → defining the Heyting algebra structure, as can
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already be seen in examples of the type f−1 : O(Y ) → O(X), where f : X → Y is
continuous [63]. Consequently, negation may not be preserved by frame maps either.)
The category Loc of locales is the opposite category to Frm, i.e. it has the same
objects but all arrows go in the opposite direction. Some topos theorists write X for a
locale and OX or O(X) for the same object seen as a frame [48, 63, 80]. Apart from
the already unfortunate fact that this notation is applied also when O(X) does not stand
for the opens of a space X but denotes a general frame, it fails to distinguish between
a topological space X and the associated locale (i.e. the frame O(X) seen as a locale).
Nonetheless, this notation often leads to elegant expressions and we will heavily use it.
If X and Y are spaces, a continuous map f : X → Y induces a frame map f−1 :
O(Y ) → O(X) and hence an arrow O(X) → O(Y ) in Loc, simply defined as f−1 read
in the opposite direction. We write the latter arrow in Loc simply as f : X → Y . In
general, an arrow in Frm is written as f−1 : O(Y ) → O(X) (whether or not the frames
in question come from topological spaces and if so, whether or not f−1 is indeed the
pullback of a continuous function between these spaces), and the corresponding arrow in
Loc is denoted by f : X → Y . Similarly, we will write C(X,Y ) for HomLoc(X,Y ) =
HomFrm(O(Y ),O(X)). In particular, for a locale X, C(X,C) will denote the set of frame
maps O(C)→ O(X).
1.4 Points and opens of locales
An element of a set X (and hence a fortiori also a point of a topological space X) may
be identified with an arrow ∗ → X, where ∗ is a given singleton (for simplicity we write ∗
instead of the more usual {∗}). The same goes for locales X, so that by definition a point of
a locale X is a locale map p : ∗ → X, hence a frame map p−1 : O(X)→ O(∗) ∼= {0, 1} = Ω;
recall that the subobject classifier in Sets, seen as a topos, is Ω = {0, 1} and note that ∗
is precisely the locale associated to Ω, as our notation Ω = O(∗) has indicated.
A point of a locale X being defined as a locale map ∗ → X or as the corresponding
frame map O(X) → Ω, an open of X is defined as a locale map X → S, where S is
the locale defined by the so-called Sierpinski space, i.e. {0, 1} with {1} as the only open
point. The corresponding frame map O(S)→ O(X) is determined by its value at 1 (since
∅ 7→ ∅ and {0, 1} 7→ X), so that we may simply look at opens in X as arrows 1 → O(X)
(where the singleton 1 is seen as the terminal object in Sets). Clearly, if X is a genuine
topological space with associated frame O(X) of opens, then each such map 1 → O(X)
corresponds to an open subset of X in the usual sense. Using this concept, the set Pt(X)
of points of a locale X may be topologized in a natural way, by declaring its opens to be
the sets of the form
Pt(U) = {p ∈ Pt(X) | p−1(U) = 1}, (7)
where U ∈ O(X) is some open. We say that a locale X is spatial if it is isomorphic (in
the category of locales) to Pt(X) (more precisely, to the locale associated to the frame
O(Pt(X)) in the above topology). Conversely, a topological space X is called sober if it is
homeomorphic to Pt(X) (which, with the notation introduced above, really stands for the
space of points of the locale associated to the frame O(X)). It is useful to know that X
is sober when it is Hausdorff. If X is sober, any frame map ϕ : O(Y )→ O(X) is induced
by a continuous map f : X → Y as ϕ = f−1. This provides additional justification for the
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notation f−1 : O(Y )→ O(X) for a general frame map, and f : X → Y for the associated
locale map. See [63, §IX.3] for a very clear exposition of all this.
For example, referring to Subsection 1.1, the characteristic function χ[ρ] : O(M) → Ω
introduced below (3) is easily checked to define a frame map. Renaming this map as
χ[ρ] ≡ ρ
−1, the associated locale map ρ : ∗ →M is therefore a point of the locale M in the
above sense. In this special case, such a point may also be described by an arrow 1→M ,
where 1 is the terminal object in Sets and M denotes M as a set rather than as a locale.
This notion of points as elements of sets will be avoided in what follows.
Thus frames and locales are two sides of the same coin: the elements 1 → O(X) of
the Heyting algebra O(X) are the opens of the associated locale X, to be thought of as
propositions, whereas the points of the locale correspond to models of the logical theory
defined by these propositions. See [51, 63] and especially [80] for a very clear explanation
of this perspective. More precisely, recall that geometric propositional logic stands for
the following fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic [63, 51, 80]. A formula ϕ in
propositional geometric logic must be built from atomic propositions using the symbols
⊤ (for “truth”), ∧ (for “and”), and ∨ (for “or”), where ∨ but not ∧ is allowed to carry
an infinite index set. (This may be motivated by the remark that to verify a proposition
∨λ∈Λpλ, one only needs to find a single pλ, whereas to verify ∧λ∈Λpλ the truth of each pλ
needs to be established, an impossible task in practice when Λ is infinite.) Sequents or
axioms must take the form ϕ→ ψ, where ϕ and ψ are formulae.
A frame O(X), then, defines a geometric propositional theory whose propositions
correspond to opens in X, combined by logical connectives given by the lattice operations
in O(X) a` la Boole. This quite literally holds in the case of classical physics discussed in
Subsection 1.1, where the opens of the locale M are just the opens U ofM as a topological
space in the naive sense, construed as propositions “the system is in a state located within
U”. Conversely, a propositional geometric theory T has an associated Lindenbaum algebra
O([T]), defined as the poset of formulae of T modulo provable equivalence, ordered by
entailment. This poset turns out to be a frame, and the (standard) models of T (that by
definition assign one of the two standard truth values 0 or 1 to the propositions of T in a
consistent way) bijectively correspond to frame maps O([T]) → {0, 1}. Identifying {0, 1}
with Ω = O(∗) as explained above, we see that a model of the theory T is the same thing
as a point ∗ → [T] of the locale [T]. More generally, one may consider a model of T in a
frame O(Y ) (generalizing the standard models where Y = ∗) to be a locale map Y → [T].
1.5 Locales in topoi
The generalization from topological spaces to frames is an important step towards our
goal, but it is not enough. Seeking further generality pertinent to quantum theory, one
may proceed in at least two different ways. First, one may generalize locales to quantales
[67]. This step leads to recognizable logical structures, but it does not relate well to the
Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics we favour.
Instead, we pass from frames as special objects in the category of sets (as defined above)
to frames in more general topoi. This is indeed possible, as all of the above concepts can be
defined in any topos by using its internal language [63]; see [12] for details. In particular,
in a topos T one may consider the category FrmT of internal frames and its opposite
category LocT of internal locales. The terminal object of the latter is the locale ∗ whose
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associated frameO(∗) is the subobject classifier Ω of T . Opens, points and models are then
defined in exactly the same way as in Sets, as long as one realizes that the identification
of Ω with {0, 1} and of ∗ with the singleton is peculiar to Sets.
In particular, a point of a locale X in T is a frame map O(X)→ Ω, whereas an open
in X may be defined as an arrow 1 → O(X). The collection Pt(X) of a locale is still
defined as the subobject of ΩO(X) corresponding to frame maps, its opens being given by
interpreting (7) in the internal language of T , where U ∈ O(X) is interpreted as an arrow
1
U
→ O(X) and p−1(U) = 1 means that p−1 ◦U = ⊤, i.e. the truth arrow ⊤ : 1→ Ω in T .
In any case, it is reassuring that topos theorists simply refer to ‘internal’ locales as
‘spaces’ [52, 53, 66]: returning to the opening words from Mac Lane and Moerdijk quoted
earlier, one might say that the unification in question is exemplified by the idea of an
internal locale with its associated Heyting algebra structure.
Our quantum phase spaces Σ, then, will be examples of locales in topoi. Their opens
1 → O(Σ) will correspond to the elementary propositions or yes-no questions about the
system, and each physical state on the system will define a map O(Σ) → Ω, where Ω is
the subobject classifier in the particular topos in which Σ is defined. It is important to
note that such maps generally fail to be frame maps, i.e. they do not define models in the
above sense. This phenomenon already arises in classical physics if one considers mixed
rather than pure states; indeed, the map χ[µ] : O(M) → Ω introduced below (6) fails to
be a frame map (except when µ happens to be pure).
However, a fundamental difference between classical and quantum physics in this re-
spect lies in the Kochen–Specker Theorem, which in its topos-theoretic incarnation (given
in different versions in [20] and in Theorem 6 below) states that (generically) the quan-
tum phase space Σ has no points at all, although the quantum system has pure states (see
Subsection 4.1). Hence whereas pure states in classical physics - as defined in the usual
sense through convexity - are also ‘pure’ in the logical sense, this is no longer the case in
quantum physics.
Nonetheless, pairing states and propositions into an internal truth value, i.e. taking
the subobject classifier to be the codomain of the pairing map, is a central goal of this
work, which we share with (and adopted from) the work of Isham et al. [20, 33]. Unlike
real-number valued pairings (which from a logical perspective might be preferable), an
Ω-valued pairing avoids both the problems with the ignorance interpretation of the Born
probabilities (see Subsection 1.2) and the bizarre ontology of the so-called Many-Worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics (cf. [14, 17]). A philosophical defence of this goal
may also be found in [18]. However, the final verdict about its validity, or rather its
relevance to physics, can only be given once the Born rule has been derived from our
Ω-valued pairing, along with an appropriate interpretation of the Born probabilities. This
derivation will be given in future work, in which the results of Section 6 of this paper will
be combined with those in [61].
1.6 Basic construction
The two notions of generalized space just described, i.e. noncommutative C*-algebras and
locales in arbitrary topoi, will be related by one of the main constructions in this paper,
which we summarize in this subsection. This construction associates a certain internal
locale to a noncommutative C*-algebra (assumed unital), and hinges on three ideas:
1 INTRODUCTION 10
1. Algebraic quantum theory [38, 43, 58];
2. Constructive Gelfand duality [5, 6, 7, 26, 28];
3. Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts [11, 73, 60].
From the first, we just adopt the methodology of describing a quantum system by a
noncommutative C*-algebra A (defined in the usual topos Sets). This move generalizes
the usual Hilbert space framework of quantum theory and has the advantage of being able
to incorporate superselection rules in infinite systems, as well as other limiting situations
like the transition from quantum to classical mechanics (and back).
As to the second, it turns out that the notion of a C*-algebra makes sense in an
arbitrary topos, so that one may, in particular, internalize commutative C*-algebras. Ex-
amples of such internal commutative C*-algebras arise from compact completely regular
locales ([7, 48], see also footnotes 2 and 3 below): if X is such a locale in some topos T ,
and if C is the locale defined by the complex numbers object in T (as in[7]), then the
object C(X,C) of all locale maps from X to C is a commutative C*-algebra in T under
natural operations. The Gelfand duality theorem of Banaschewski and Mulvey [7] states
that, like in the case of the topos Sets, up to isomorphism these are the only examples
of unital commutative C*-algebras: if A is a unital commutative C*-algebra in a topos
T , there exists a compact completely regular locale Σ such that A ∼= C(Σ,C). Here ∼=
denotes isomorphism in the category T and the arrows implementing this isomorphism are
C*-algebra maps. Moreover, this isomorphism extends to a categorical duality between
compact completely regular locales and unital commutative C*-algebras in T . We call the
locale Σ or Σ(A) the Gelfand spectrum of A. It is defined up to isomorphism of locales.
Third, Niels Bohr’s “doctrine of classical concepts” states that we can only look at
the quantum world through classical glasses, measurement merely providing a “classical
snapshot of reality”. The combination of all such snapshots should then provide a complete
picture. In Bohr’s own words ([11], p. 209):
However far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explana-
tion, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms. (. . . )
The argument is simply that by the word experiment we refer to a situation
where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and
that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangements and of the results
of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable
application of the terminology of classical physics.
This doctrine has a transparent formulation in algebraic quantum theory, to the effect
that the empirical content of a quantum theory described by a certain noncommutative
C*-algebra A is contained in suitable commutative C*-algebras associated to A. In the
simplest case, which we study in this paper, these are simply the (unital) commutative
C∗-subalgebras of A. (To understand classical behaviour in general, the pertinent com-
mutative C*-algebras have to be extracted from A using limiting procedures like ~→ 0 or
N →∞ [60].)
The following construction weaves these three threads together. Let A be a unital
C*-algebra (in the usual sense, i.e. in Sets) and let C(A) be the collection of its unital
commutative C∗-subalgebras, partially ordered by inclusion. We regard the poset C(A)
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as a category, whose objects are the unital C∗-subalgebras C ⊆ A, and whose Hom-sets
HomC(A)(C,D) consist of a single arrow if C ⊆ D and are empty otherwise. The category
C(A) is a catalogue of all ‘classical snapshots of reality’ one may take of the quantum
system described by A.
Recall that for any category C, the topos SetsC has functors C → Sets as objects and
natural transformations as arrows [63]. Put
T (A) = SetsC(A). (8)
The philosophical idea is that as observers we are confined to the topos T (A), whereas the
physical system itself divinely exists in the ambient topos Sets. According to Bohr and
Heisenberg, the system might seem to behave probabilistically from our limited classical
perspective, but this behaviour is just a consequence of our confinement to T (A) (cf.
Theorem 14 below).
We will underline entities internal to T (A). It turns out that the tautological func-
tor A : C 7→ C, which (with some abuse of notation) maps a unital commutative C∗-
subalgebra C of A (seen as an object of the category C(A)) into itself (seen as a set), is a
unital commutative C*-algebra in T (A). We call A the Bohrification of A. It has an asso-
ciated Gelfand spectrum Σ(A), which is a locale in T (A). The map A 7→ Σ(A) associates
a ‘space’ Σ(A) in the sense of topos theory to a ‘space’ A in the sense of noncommutative
geometry.
In principle, this construction leads to the solution of all five problems listed at the
beginning of Subsection 1.2:
1. The quantum phase space of the system described by A is the locale Σ ≡ Σ(A) in
the topos T (A).
2. The “subsets” of the locale Σ acting as elementary propositions about A are simply
the ‘opens’ in Σ, defined as arrows 1 → O(Σ) in T (A). Thus the quantum logic of
A is given by the Heyting algebra underlying Σ(A).
3. Observables a ∈ A define locale maps δ(a) : Σ → IR, where IR is the so-called in-
terval domain. States ρ on A yield probability measures (more precisely, valuations)
µρ on Σ.
4. An open interval ∆ ⊆ R defines an arrow 1 ∆ //O(IR) of T (A) (where 1 is the ter-
minal object in T (A)), which, composed with the map O(IR)
δ(a)−1
//O(Σ) underlying
δ(a), yields the desired proposition
1
[a∈∆]
//O(Σ) = 1
∆
//O(IR)
δ(a)−1
//O(Σ).
5. State-proposition pairing is defined exactly as in (4), i.e.by
1
〈a∈∆,ρ〉
// Ω = 1
[a∈∆]
//O(Σ)
χ[ρ]
//Ω, (9)
where Ω is the subobject classifier of T (A) and χ[ρ] is the characteristic map of the
subobject [ρ] of O(Σ) consisting of all opens U of Σ with µρ(U) = 1 (defined through
the internal language of T (A)).
1 INTRODUCTION 12
The construction of δ(a) is inspired by, and partly generalizes, the Daseinisation map of
Do¨ring and Isham ([34, 35], cf. also Appendix B).
The subobject classifier Ω is the functor C(A)→ Sets given by
Ω(C) = {S ⊆↑C | S is an upper set}, (10)
where for any poset P an upper set in P is a subset U ⊆ P for which x ∈ U and x 6 y
implies y ∈ U , and one writes ↑x = {y ∈ P | x 6 y} for the so-called principal upper set
on x. Note that Ω(C) is a poset (and even a frame) under inclusion as partial ordering,
with ∅ as bottom element, and ↑ C as top element. (One might think of the principal
upper set ↑C on the “classical snapshot of reality” C as the collection of all finer versions
of the knowledge present in C.) The subobject classifier Ω is a (covariant) functor by
stipulating that if C ⊆ D, then the induced map Ω(C)→ Ω(D) is given by S 7→ S ∩ ↑D.
In this setup, we have taken Sets as the ambient topos. There are several reasons,
however, one might want to consider other ambient topoi. Leaving the matter to future
investigation, let us briefly indicate an important application. An algebraic quantum
field theory (AQFT) [43] may be defined as a functor (O(M),⊆)→ CStar satisfying
certain separability constraints, where M is Minkowski space-time and O(M) is its set of
opens [13]. Analogous to Theorem 5 below, an AQFT may then be shown to be given by
a single C*-algebra in the presheaf topos SetsO(M).
1.7 Internal and external language
We have repeatedly used the word ‘internal’ for a construction intrinsic to a certain topos
T ; for example, A and its Gelfand spectrum Σ are internal to T (A), as is the Heyting
algebra structure of Σ. At this point, confusion may arise, for on the one hand the
propositional logic carried by Σ is intuitionistic, while on the other hand all constructions
(ranging from the initial C*-algebra A to the locale Σ(A) as an object in the associated
functor topos SetsC(A)) eventually arise from the topos Sets, whose underlying logic is
classical.
To clarify this, we remark that it is a very important aspect of topos theory that
one may, indeed, usually adopt two points of view: an external one and an internal one.
External constructions are carried out using classical mathematics, which (at least for the
topoi used in this paper) takes place in the familiar topos Sets (even if the constructions
in question are concerned with some other topos). Internal constructions, on the other
hand, only use concepts intrinsic to the topos one is studying. This idea is formalized by
the internal orMitchell-Be´nabou language associated with each topos [12, 51, 63]. This is a
logical language that for many instances and purposes allows one to reason within a given
topos as if it were the topos Sets. For example, one may employ the usual logical and
set-theoretic symbols (the latter even if an object X has no or few elements in the sense
of arrows 1 → X), whose meaning is determined by the so-called Kripke-Joyal semantics
associated with the Mitchell-Be´nabou language. We will actually use this semantics in
our theory of state-proposition pairing. However, using the internal language one may (in
general) neither appeal to the law of excluded middle x ∨ ¬x = ⊤, nor to the Axiom of
Choice (although restricted versions thereof are sometimes valid). These limitations are
a consequence of the fact that the internal language of a topos happens to be based on
intuitionistic predicate logic (see [12, 51] for the precise rules).
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Figure 1: Illustration of universes of discourse
Thus a topos can be seen as a universe of discourse, to which a mathematician or
observer may wish to confine himself. On the other hand, even the internal language
and associated logic can alternatively be studied externally with classical meta-logic. The
various entities at play in our application of topos theory to quantum physics are illustrated
in Figure 1. This illustrates, in particular, that our quantum logic is meant to be the logic
of an ‘internal’ observer, with all the restrictions this brings with it (whereas the quantum
‘logic’ of Birkhoff and von Neumann, to the extent it is a logic at all, rather pertains to a
fictitious entity like Laplace’s demon, to whose intellect ‘nothing would be uncertain and
the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.’)
Let us give three closely related examples of internal versus external descriptions, each
relevant to our logical approach to quantum theory.
First, a fundamental fact of topos theory is that the subobjects SubT (A) of a given
object A in a topos T (with subobject classifier ΩT ) form a (complete) Heyting algebra.
• Externally, one simply looks at SubT (A) as a set, equipped with the structure of a
Heyting algebra in the category Sets.
• Internally, SubT (A) is described as the exponential Ω
A
T (or power ‘set’ P(A)), which
is a Heyting algebra object in T . See [63, p. 201].
Second, as these Heyting algebras are complete, they are frames. The explicit internal
description of a frame or locale is rather complicated as far as the completeness property
of the underlying lattice is concerned [12]. However, if the topos T = Sh(X) is that of
sheaves on a locale X (which, we recall, consists of those functors F in SetsO(X)
op
that
satisfy a gluing condition stating that F (U) can be computed from the F (Ui) under any
open covering U = ∪iUi [63, Ch. II]), a simple external description is available [49, 53] (also
cf. [51, §C1.6]): a locale L in Sh(X) is externally described by a locale map f : L → X in
Sets, with
L = L(X). (11)
Furthermore, if L1 and L2 are locales in Sh(X) with external descriptions fi : Li → X,
then an internal locale map g : L1 → L2 in Sh(X) is externally given by a locale map
g : L1 → L2 in Sets such that f2 ◦ g = f1.
To see that this situation is relevant to our construction, first recall the Alexandrov
topology on a poset P . Its opens are simply the upper sets, and the special upper sets
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of the form U = ↑x form a basis of the Alexandrov topology. Equipping P with the
Alexandrov topology, one has an isomorphism of categories
SetsP ∼= Sh(P ). (12)
To understand this, just note that a sheaf F on P is determined by its values on the basis
opens ↑x; a functor F : P → Sets then corresponds to F by
F (x) = F (↑x). (13)
It is, then, immediate from (8) and (12) that
T (A) ∼= Sh(C(A)), (14)
so that we have the above-mentioned external description of locales to our avail, with
X = C(A).
Explicitly, to describe an internal locale L in Sh(X) externally, i.e. in terms of the
topos Sets, consider the set ΓO(L) = HomSh(X)(1,O(L)) of global sections of the asso-
ciated frame O(L); this set coincides with O(L)(X) (since a natural transformation in
HomSh(X)(1,O(L)) is determined by its value at X) and defines a frame O(L)(X) in Sets
under the lattice structure borrowed fromO(L). For V ⊆ U , let LUV : O(L)(U)→ O(L)(V )
be the arrow part of the functor O(L) : O(X)op → Sets, with special case LV ≡ L
X
V . The
completeness of O(L) implies that LV has a left adjoint L
∗
V : O(L)(V )→ O(L)(X), which
in turn defines a map f∗ : O(X)→ O(L)(X) by f∗ : V 7→ L∗V (⊤L(V )), where ⊤L(V ) is the
top element of the lattice O(L)(V ). This is a frame map, and if we writeO(Y ) = O(L)(X),
the corresponding locale map f : Y → X is the external description of L.
Conversely, a locale L in Sets along with a locale map f : L → X (i.e. a frame map
f∗ : O(X) → O(L)) induces a locale L in Sh(X), defined as the sheaf L(U) = {V ∈ L |
V 6 f∗(U)}. These constructions are adjoint to each other, yielding an equivalence of the
category Loc(Sh(X)) of locales in Sh(X) and the slice category Loc/X relative to the
category Loc of locales in Sets.
For us, the external description of locales is useful for two reasons:
1. Returning to (9), we are clearly interested in the set
ΓO(Σ) ∼= Hom
Sets
C(A)(1,O(Σ))
of opens in Σ, as it encodes the quantum logic of our C*-algebra A. Let O(Σ) be
the sheaf on C(A) that corresponds to O(Σ) by (13), so that ΓO(Σ) ∼= ΓO(Σ), with
ΓO(Σ) = HomSh(C(A))(1,O(Σ)). Clearly, if a poset P has a bottom element ⊥ and
Z is any object in SetsP , then ΓZ ∼= Z(⊥). This applies to P = C(A) with ⊥= C ·1,
so that
ΓO(Σ) ∼= O(Σ)(C · 1) ∼= O(Σ)(C(A)) = O(Σ), (15)
where we have used (11). Hence the external description of the quantum logic of the
C*-algebra A is entirely given in terms of the locale Σ in Sets.
2. Important internal number systems in T (A) that are defined by geometric propo-
sitional theories T (see Subsection 1.4) may be computed from (13) and their de-
scription in Sh(C(A)), which in turn is based on their external description in Sets.
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Specifically, if [T] is the locale defined by T in Sets, then the locale [T] ≡ [T]Sh(X)
giving the interpretation of T in Sh(X) has external description π1 : X × [T] → X,
where π1 is projection on the first component. It follows that the frame O([T]) in
Sh(X) corresponding to [T] is given by the sheaf U 7→ O(U × [T]). Applying this
to the case at hand, we see that frame O([T]) corresponding to the interpretation
[T] ≡ [T]C(A) of T in T (A) is given by the functor
O([T]) : C 7→ O(↑C × [T]). (16)
See Subsections 2.3 and 5.1 for examples of this procedure.
Our third example applies the second one to points of locales [63], and continues the
discussion in Subsection 1.4:
• Internally, a point of a locale Y in a general topos T (internal to Sets for simplicity)
is a locale map ∗ → Y , which is the same thing as an internal frame map O(Y )→ Ω
(where Ω is the subobject classifier in T ).
• Externally, we look at Ω as the frame SubT (1) in Sets of subobjects of the terminal
object 1 in T . The locale in Sets with frame SubT (1) is called the localic reflection
Loc(T ) of T , i.e. O(Loc(T )) = SubT (1). For example, in T = Sh(X) one has
SubSh(X)(1) ∼= O(X) and hence Loc(Sh(X)) ∼= X. Applying the second example
above, we find that the external description of the locale ∗ in Sh(X) is just id : X →
X, so that points in a locale L in Sh(X) with external description f : Y → X are
given by locale maps ϕ : X → Y that satisfy f ◦ ϕ = id, i.e. cross-sections of f .
The fourth example continues both the previous one and the discussion of models in
Subsection 1.4. We initially defined a standard model of a geometric propositional theory
T as a locale map ∗ → [T], and subsequently mentioned more general models Y → [T],
still in Sets. We now consider even more general models of T in a topos T .
• Externally, these are given by locale maps Loc(T ) → [T] in Sets. This is because
the classifying topos of T is Sh([T]), and one has an equivalence between geometric
morhisms T → Sh([T]) (which classify T-models in T , cf. [63, Thm. X.6.1]) and
locale maps Loc(T )→ [T] (see [63, § IX.5]).
• Internally, one may interpret the theory T in T and thus define a locale [T]T internal
to T . The points of this locale, i.e. the locale maps ∗ → [T]T or frame maps
O([T]T )→ ΩT , describe the models of T in T internally.
One may explicitly verify the equivalence between the internal and the external de-
scriptions for T = Sh(X), for in that case the external description of [T]T is the map
π1 : X × [T] → X. Hence locale maps ϕ : X → X × [T] that satisfy π1 ◦ ϕ = id are just
(unconstrained) locale maps X → [T].
1.8 Observation and approximation
Our construction of the locale map δ(a) : Σ → IR in Section 1.6 involves the so-called
interval domain IR [74]. To motivate its definition, consider the approximation of real
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numbers by nested intervals with endpoints in Q. For example, the real number π can be
described by specifying the sequence
[3, 4], [3.1, 3.2], [3.14, 3.15], [3.141, 3.142], . . .
Each individual interval may be interpreted as finitary information about the real number
under scrutiny, involving the single observation that the real number is contained in the
interval. This description of the reals, which goes back to L.E.J. Brouwer, is formalized
by the notion of the interval domain. Consider the poset IR whose elements are compact
intervals [a, b] in R (including singletons [a, a] = {a}), ordered by reverse inclusion (for
a smaller interval means that we have more information about the real number that the
ever smaller intervals converge to). This poset is a so-called dcpo (directed complete
partial order); directed suprema are simply intersections. As such, it carries the Scott
topology [2, 74], whose closed sets are lower sets that are closed under suprema of directed
subsets. Here a lower set in a poset P is a subset L ⊆ P such that x ∈ L and y 6 x
implies y ∈ L; equivalently, ↓ L ⊆ L, where ↓ L = {y ∈ P | ∃x ∈ L : y 6 x}. (Lower
sets are sometimes called down sets or downward closed sets.) Consequently, Scott opens
must be upper sets U (defined in the obvious way) with the additional property that for
every directed set D with
∨
D ∈ U the intersection D ∩ U is nonempty. In the case of
IR, this means that each open interval (p, q) in R (with p = −∞ and q = +∞ allowed)
corresponds to a Scott open {[a, b] | p < a, b < q} in IR, and these opens form a basis of the
Scott topology. The collection OScott(IR) is, of course, a frame, initially defined in Sets.
The basis opens (r, s) may be reinterpreted as a collection of generators for this frame,
which from the point of view of generators and relations differs from the frame O(R) of
Dedekind reals in that the relation (p, q) = (p, q1) ∨ (p1, q) for p 6 p1 6 q1 6 q holds for
the reals, but not for the interval domain (see [51, D4.7.4] or Subsection 2.3 below for the
other relations for O(R)). The interval domain admits an internal definition in any topos.
Its realization in T (A) will play an important role in this paper; see Subsection 5.1.
A related notion of approximation appears when considering an observable a ∈ Asa of
a quantum system described by a C*-algebra A, as seen from inside its associated topos
T (A). Specifically, we should approximate a within each classical snapshot C of A, where
C ∈ C(A) is some commutative subalgebra. The difficulty is, of course, that a need not
lie in C, but neither is there a single element of C that forms the ‘best approximation’ of
a in C. The best one can do is approximate a by a family of elements of C, as follows.
The self-adjoint part Asa of a C*-algebra A has a natural partial order 6, defined by
a 6 b iff b− a = c∗c for some c ∈ A. (Equivalently, a 6 b iff b− a = f2 for some f ∈ Asa.)
This partial order is linear— in the sense that a + c 6 b + c whenever a 6 b. For the
C*-algebra A = C(X,C) one just recovers the pointwise order on (real-valued) functions,
since Asa = C(X,R). For A = B(H), the bounded operator on Hilbert space H, one
has a ≥ 0 for a ∈ Asa iff (Ψ, aΨ) ≥ 0 for all Ψ ∈ H. (Indeed, this is really a pointwise
order as well, if one regards operators a on H as functions aˆ on H by aˆ(Ψ) = (Ψ, aΨ).
See e.g.[58].) Thus one may approximate a in C by collections of intervals of the type
{[f, g] | f, g ∈ Csa, f 6 a 6 g} (note that this is inhabited, since f = −‖a‖ · 1 and
g = ‖a‖ · 1 occur). Since the intervals [f, g] in Csa fail to form a dcpo, however, a slight
adaptation of this idea is needed, for which we refer to Subsection 5.1 below.
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1.9 Structure of this article
Section 2 reviews the Gelfand duality theory in a topos due to Banaschewski and Mulvey.
Our original results are as follows.
1. The construction of the ‘quantum phase space’ Σ(A) from a C*-algebra A in Sets
as the Gelfand spectrum of the Bohrification A of A in the topos T (A) is explained
in Section 3. This section also contains our version of the Kochen–Specker Theorem.
2. Section 4 first describes the construction of states on A as probability integrals on
the self-adjoint part of A. These, in turn, are equivalent to probability valuations
on its Gelfand spectrum Σ(A). On this basis, we eventually show that states define
subobjects of the quantum phase space Σ(A), as in classical physics (see (3)).
3. The interpretation of observables in A in terms of the Bohrification A is the subject
of Section 5. In particular, we give our analogue of the Daseinisation map of Do¨ring
and Isham in Subsection 5.2 (and more fully in Appendix A.2).
4. The pairing of states and propositions is elucidated in Section 6, yielding an element
of the subobject classifier of T (A) that we explicitly compute. This pairing connects
the mathematical constructions to quantum physics and completes steps 1 to 5 of
our general program mentioned at the beginning of Subsection 1.2.
Appendix A contains a number of technical results that somewhat distract from the main
development of the paper. Finally, Appendix B discusses related work by Do¨ring and
Isham, which partly inspired the present article.
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2 C*-algebras and Gelfand duality in a topos
This section recapitulates a constructive version of Gelfand duality, which is valid in
every topos [5, 6, 7]. Recall that the usual version of Gelfand duality characterises unital
commutative C*-algebras as algebras of complex-valued continuous functions on a compact
Hausdorff space. More generally, the category cCStar of unital commutative C*-algebras
and unital ∗-homomorphisms is dual to the category KHausSp of compact Hausdorff
spaces and continuous maps (see [48] for a proof aimed at algebraists and [59] for a proof
in the spirit of C*-algebras). From a topos-theoretic point of view, this formulation is
internal to the topos Sets, since both categories are defined relative to it.
To understand the generalization of Gelfand duality to arbitrary topoi, a slight refor-
mulation of the situation in Sets is appropriate: we replace topological spaces X by the
associated locales, and hence replace KHausSp by the equivalent category KRegLoc of
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compact regular locales [48].2 Consequently, the duality cCStar ≃ KHausSp may be
replaced by cCStar ≃ KRegLoc: the contravariant functor cCStar→ KRegLoc is still
given by A 7→ Σ(A), where Σ(A) is the locale defined by the usual Gelfand spectrum of
A (i.e. its pure state space), and in the opposite direction one has the familiar expression
X 7→ C(X,C), in which the right-hand side now stands for the locale maps from X to C.
For technical reasons, in general topoi regular compact locales have to be replaced
by completely regular compact locales,3 but otherwise one has a direct generalization of
the above reformulation of Gelfand duality in Sets. The following theorem is predicated
on an internal definition of the category cCStar, which we shall give in Subsection 2.1.
Here and in what follows, all mathematical symbols are to be interpreted in the internal
language of the topos T at hand.
Theorem 1 (Gelfand duality in a topos) [5, 6, 7]. In any topos T , there is a cate-
gorical duality (i.e. contravariant equivalence)
cCStar
Σ
//
⊥ KRegLoc,
C(−,CT )
oo
where the categories in questions are defined internally to T .
For A ∈ cCStar, the locale Σ(A) is called the Gelfand spectrum of A. Here the symbol
CT stands for the locale of Dedekind complex numbers in T .
2.1 C*-algebras in a topos
In any topos T (with natural numbers object), the rationals Q can be interpreted [63,
§ VI.8], as can the Gaussian integers CQ = {p + qi : p, q ∈ Q}. For example, the inter-
pretation of CQ in a functor topos SetsC (where, in our case, C is a poset) is the constant
functor that assigns the set CQ to every C ∈ C.
A *-algebra in T is a vector space A over CQ that carries an associative bilinear map
· : A×A→ A, and is furthermore equipped with a map (−)∗ : A→ A satisfying
(a+ b)∗ = a∗ + b∗, (z · a)∗ = z · a∗, (a · b)∗ = b∗ · a∗, a∗∗ = a,
for all a, b ∈ A and z ∈ CQ. A is called commutative if a · b = b · a for all a, b ∈ A, and
unital if there is a neutral element 1 for the multiplication.
To define an internal C*-algebra, we define a seminorm on such an algebra; in general,
a norm may not actually be definable in the internal language of a topos. This is a relation
2A locale L is compact if every subset S ⊆ L with
W
S = ⊤ has a finite subset F with
W
F = ⊤. It is
regular if every element of L is the join of the elements well inside itself, where a is well inside b (denoted
a≪ b) if there exists c with c ∧ a =⊥ and c ∨ b = ⊤. The (internal) categories KRegLoc and KHausSp
in a topos T are equivalent when the full axiom of choice is available in T [48].
3See [48] or [7] for the definition of complete regularity. If the axiom of dependent choice (stating that
for any nonempty set X and any relation R ⊆ X × X such that for all x there is an y with (x, y) ∈ R,
there is a sequence (xn) such that (xn, xn+1) ∈ R for each n ∈ N) is valid in a topos, then compact regular
locales are automatically completely regular. This is the case in Sets, for example (where, of course, the
full axiom of choice holds), and also in topoi like T (A) consisting of functors whose codomain validates
dependent choice [40].
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N ⊆ A×Q+, which in Sets would have the meaning that (a, q) ∈ N iff ‖a‖ < q. In general,
N must satisfy
(0, p) ∈ N,
∃q∈Q+[(a, q) ∈ N ],
(a, p) ∈ N → (a∗, p) ∈ N,
(a, q) ∈ N ↔ ∃p<q[(a, p) ∈ N ],
(a, p) ∈ N ∧ (b, q) ∈ N → (a+ b, p + q) ∈ N,
(a, p) ∈ N ∧ (b, q) ∈ N → (a · b, p · q) ∈ N,
(a, p) ∈ N → (z · a, p · q) ∈ N (|z| < q),
for all a, b ∈ A, p, q ∈ Q+, and z ∈ CQ. For a unital *-algebra, we also require
(1, p) ∈ N (p > 1).
If the seminorm relation furthermore satisfies
(a∗ · a, q2) ∈ N ↔ (a, q) ∈ N
for all a ∈ A and q ∈ Q+, then A is said to be a pre-semi-C*-algebra.
To proceed to a C*-algebra, one requires a = 0 whenever (a, q) ∈ N for all q in Q+,
making the seminorm into a norm, and subsequently one requires this normed space to be
complete in a suitable sense (see [7] for details). As a consequence of its completeness, a
C*-algebra is automatically an algebra over a suitable completion of CQ (and not just over
CQ itself, as baked into the definition). Note that in general topoi one has to distinguish
certain real and complex number objects that coincide in Sets. From Q, one may construct
the locale Rd ≡ R of Dedekind real numbers [63, § VI.8] (see also Subsection 2.3 below);
we will drop the suffix d for simplicity. The object Pt(C) (which is the completion of CQ
meant above) comprises the points of the complexified locale C = R + iR; see also [7]
for a direct description that avoids R. In Sets, C is the locale with frame O(C), where
(abusing notation) C are the usual complex numbers. In any topos, the one-dimensional
C*-algebra C(∗,C) is nothing but Pt(C) and has Gelfand spectrum ∗ (i.e. the locale with
frame Ω).
A unital *-homomorphism between C*-algebras A and B is, as usual, a linear map
f : A→ B satisfying f(ab) = f(a)f(b), f(a∗) = f(a)∗ and f(1A) = 1B . Unital C*-algebras
with unital *-homomorphisms form a category CStar (internal to T ); commutative unital
C*-algebras form a full subcategory cCStar thereof.
2.2 Spectrum
The definition of the category KRegLoc of completely regular compact locales can be
internalized without difficulty. The next step is to explicitly describe the Gelfand spectrum
Σ(A) ≡ Σ of a given commutative C*-algebra A. We will do so following the reformulation
in [26, 28] of the pioneering work of Banaschewski and Mulvey [7].
To motivate the description, note that even in Sets the spectrum is now described
(with the usual notational ambiguity explained in Subsection 1.3) as the locale Σ defined
2 C*-ALGEBRAS AND GELFAND DUALITY IN A TOPOS 20
by the frame O(Σ) of open subsets of the usual Gelfand spectrum Σ of A (defined as the
subset of the dual A∗ consisting of space of nonzero multiplicative functionals on A in
the relative weak∗ topology). The topology on the space Σ can be described by giving a
sub-base, for which one often takes U(a,ρ0,ε) = {ρ | |ρ(a) − ρ0(a)| < ε} for a ∈ A, ρ0 ∈ Σ,
ε > 0. However, a much simpler choice of sub-base would be
Da = {ρ ∈ Σ | ρ(a) > 0}, (17)
where a ∈ Asa. Both the property that the ρ are multiplicative and the fact that the Da
form a sub-base of the Gelfand topology may then be expressed lattice-theoretically by
saying that O(Σ) is the frame FAsa freely generated by the formal symbols Da, a ∈ Asa,
subject to the relations
D1 = ⊤, (18)
Da ∧ D−a = ⊥, (19)
D−b2 = ⊥, (20)
Da+b 6 Da ∨ Db, (21)
Dab = (Da ∧ Db) ∨ (D−a ∧ D−b), (22)
supplemented with the ‘regularity rule’
Da 6
∨
r∈Q+
Da−r. (23)
This turns out to be a correct description of the spectrum of A also in an arbitrary
topos T , in which case (18)–(23) have to be interpreted in T , of course.4
2.3 Gelfand transform
Classically, for a commutative unital C*-algebra A the Gelfand transform A
∼=
→ C(Σ,C)
is given by a 7→ aˆ with aˆ(ρ) = ρ(a). In our setting it is convenient to restrict the Gelfand
transform to Asa, yielding an isomorphism
Asa ∼= C(Σ,R). (24)
In a topos T , the Gelfand transform of an internal commutative unital C*-algebra A in
T associates a locale map
aˆ : Σ→ RT , (25)
to each a ∈ Asa, where Σ is the spectrum of A and RT is the locale of internal Dedekind
real numbers in T ; see below. Recalling from Subsection 1.3 that aˆ is by definition a frame
map
aˆ−1 : O(RT )→ O(Σ), (26)
4 See [77] and the Appendix to this paper for the procedure of constructing a frame from generators
and relations. Equivalently, in the spirit of [7] one could rephrase the above definition by saying that Σ is
the locale [T] corresponding to the propositional geometric theory T (in the sense explained in Subsection
1.4) determined by the collection of propositions Da, a ∈ Asa, subject to the axioms (18)–(23), with 6
replaced by ⊢.
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and using the “λ-conversion rule” Y→Z
X
Y×X→Z [63, §I.6], we note that the Gelfand transform
may alternatively be regarded as a map
·ˆ : Asa ×O(RT )→ O(Σ). (27)
Thus the use of the symbol a ∈ Asa in the internal language of T may be avoided in
principle. In practice, however, we will often use the notation (25) or (26), and hence the
formal symbols Da. For example, in the description (18)–(23) of the spectrum Σ in terms
of generators and relations, it is sufficient to define the frame map (26) on basic opens
(−∞, r) and (s,∞) in RT . In the classical case (i.e. in Sets) discussed above, one has
aˆ−1(0,∞) = Da from (17), and this remains true in general if aˆ
−1 has the meaning (26).
Using (18)–(21), one then finds
aˆ−1 : (−∞, s) 7→ Ds−a; (28)
(r,∞) 7→ Da−r. (29)
As aˆ−1 is a frame map, for bounded open intervals (r, s) we therefore obtain5
aˆ−1 : (r, s) 7→ Ds−a ∧ Da−r. (30)
We now recall an explicit construction of the Dedekind reals [39], [51, D4.7.4 & D4.7.5].
Define the propositional geometric theory TR generated by formal symbols (p, q) ∈ Q×Q
with p < q, ordered as (p, q) 6 (p′, q′) iff p′ 6 p and q 6 q′, subject to the following axioms
(or relations):
1. (p1, q1) ∧ (p2, q2) = (max{p1, p2},min{q1, q2}) if max{p1, p2} < min{q1, q2}, and
(p1, q1) ∧ (p2, q2) = ⊥ otherwise;
2. (p, q) =
∨
{(p′, q′) | p < p′ < q′ < q};
3. ⊤ =
∨
{(p, q) | p < q};
4. (p, q) = (p, q1) ∨ (p1, q) if p 6 p1 6 q1 6 q.
This theory may be interpreted in any topos T , defining an internal locale (TR)T ≡ RT
with associated frame O(RT ). Points m of RT , i.e. frame maps m−1 : O(RT ) → ΩT ,
correspond bijectively to Dedekind cuts (L,U) of Q (cf. [63, p. 321]) in the following way:
a model m determines a Dedekind cut by
L = {p ∈ Q | m |= (p,∞)}; (31)
U = {q ∈ Q | m |= (−∞, q)}, (32)
where (p,∞) and (−∞, q) are defined in terms of the formal generators of the frame O(Q)
by (p,∞) =
∨
{(p, r) | p < r} and (−∞, q) =
∨
{(r, q) | r < q}. The notation m |= (p, q)
used here means that m−1(p, q) = ⊤, where ⊤ : 1 → ΩT is the truth element of ΩT and
5Banaschewski and Mulvey [7] work with such intervals (r, s) as basic opens, in terms of which they
write the Gelfand transform as aˆ−1 : (r, s) 7→ a ∈ (r, s). Here the role of generators of the locale Σ is played
by elementary propositions of the logical theory generating Σ as its Lindenbaum algebra, our generator
Da corresponding to their proposition a ∈ (0,∞). Classically, the proposition a ∈ (r, s) may be identified
with the open a−1(r, s) in the spectrum Σ; cf. Subsection 1.1.
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(p, q) is seen as an arrow (p, q) : 1→ Q×Q→ O(RT ). Conversely, a Dedekind cut (L,U)
uniquely determines a point m that maps a generator I = (p, q) to m(I) = ⊤ iff I ∩U 6= ∅
and I ∩ L 6= ∅. The Dedekind reals Pt(RT ), then, are defined in any topos T as the
subobject of P(QT )× P(QT ) consisting of those (L,U) that are points of RT [63].
We mention four examples:
1. In T = Sets, a point m of R ≡ RSets corresponds to a real x described in the usual
calculus way, so that L = {p ∈ Q | p < x} and U = {q ∈ Q | x > q}. Hence Pt(R)
may be identified with R in the usual sense, and R is spatial as a locale; its frame
O(R) is just the usual topology of R [51, D4.7.4]. From this perspective, the first
condition in the definition of TR enforces that L and U are lower and upper sections
of Q, respectively, the second implies that they are open, and the third means that
L and U are both inhabited. The fourth – Dedekind – relation says that L and U
‘kiss’ each other.6
2. If X is a topological space (or, more generally, a locale), the structure of the locale
RSh(X) and its associated sheaf of Dedekind reals Pt(RSh(X)) in the topos Sh(X) of
sheaves on X follows from the argument above (16) in Subsection 1.7. First, the
frame of of Dedekind reals is given by the sheaf
O(R)Sh(X) : U 7→ O(U × R), (33)
whereas the Dedekind real numbers object is the sheaf (See also [63])
Pt(R)Sh(X) : U 7→ C(U,R). (34)
3. Consequently, using (12) and (13) we infer that in our functor topos T (A) =
SetsC(A), the frame of Dedekind reals is the functor
O(R) : C 7→ O((↑C)× R); (35)
the set on the right-hand side may be identified with the set of monotone functions
from ↑C to O(R).7
Perhaps surprisingly, the associated functor of points Pt(R) may be identified with
the constant functor
Pt(R) : C 7→ R; (36)
6The collection of L satisfying only the first three relations forms the locale of lower reals, which we
denote by Rl. Locale maps to Rl are, classically, lower-semicontinuous real-valued functions. Analogously,
there is a locale Ru of upper reals. See [51].
7 This identification proceeds in two steps. First, for any topological space X one has a bijection
O(X) ∼= C(X,S), where S = {0, 1} carries the Sierpinski topology, see Subsection 1.4; explicitly, U ∈ O(X)
is mapped to χU , whereas in the opposite direction g ∈ C(X,S) is sent to g
−1({1}). Hence O(↑C × R) ∼=
C(↑ C × R, S) (with apologies for the double use of C, first for ‘continuous’ and second for C ∈ C(A)).
Second, in general λ-conversion or ‘currying’ gives a bijection between functions Y ×R→ S and functions
Y → SR; with Y =↑ C equipped with the Alexandrov topology and C(R, S) ∼= O(R), continuity then
translates into monotonicity.
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this follows from (34) and the fact that Alexandrov-continuous functions U → R (or,
indeed, into any Hausdorff space) must be locally constant on any open U ⊆ C(A).8
4. If Σ is the Gelfand spectrum of a commutative C*-algebra A in T , in the sheaf topos
Sh(Σ) internal to T we similarly have
Pt(R)Sh(Σ) : U 7→ C(U,R). (37)
Here we identify the open U of Σ with its associated sublocale {V ∈ Σ | V 6 U} of
Σ. This locale, as well as R, is to be interpreted in the ambient topos T as explained
in the above items.
Example 4 leads to an elegant reformulation of the isomorphism (24) given by the
Gelfand theory: since
C(Σ,R) = Γ(Pt(R)Sh(Σ)), (38)
where Γ is the global sections functor, one infers from (24) that
Asa ∼= Γ(Pt(R)Sh(Σ)). (39)
In other words, the self-adjoint part of a unital commutative C*-algebra A in a topos is
isomorphic to the global sections of the Dedekind reals in the internal topos of sheaves on
its spectrum (and A itself “is” the complex numbers in the same sense).
3 The internal C*-algebra and its spectrum
In this section we explain the association of a particular commutative C*-algebra A, which
is internal to a certain functor topos T (A), to a (generally) noncommutative C*-algebra
A. As mentioned in the Introduction, this construction is motivated by Bohr’s doctrine
of classical concepts, so that we call A the Bohrification of A.
3.1 The topos associated to a C*-algebra
We first construct the topos T (A) in which A resides and draw attention to the functorial-
ity of the map A 7→ T (A). We denote the category of partially ordered sets and monotone
functions by Poset.
Proposition 2 There is a functor C : CStar→ Poset, defined on objects as
C(A) = {C ⊆ A | C ∈ cCStar},
ordered by inclusion. On a morphism f : A→ B of CStar, it acts as C(f) : C(A)→ C(B)
by the direct image C 7→ f(C).
8We take X = C(A), equipped with the Alexandrov topology, and prove that in this topology any
f ∈ C(U,R) must be locally constant. Suppose C 6 D in U , take and V ⊆ R open with f(C) ∈ V . Then
tautologically C ∈ f−1(V ) and f−1(V ) is open by continuity of f . But the smallest open set containing
C is ↑C, which contains D, so that f(D) ∈ V . Taking V = (f(C) − ǫ,∞) gives f(D) > f(C) − ǫ for all
ǫ > 0, whence f(D) > f(C), whereas V = (−∞, f(C) + ǫ) yields f(D) 6 f(C). Hence f(C) = f(D).
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As announced in (8) in the Introduction, the collection of functors C(A) → Sets forms a
topos T (A) = SetsC(A). This is the topos associated to A. We recall our convention to
underline entities internal to T (A). The subobject classifier Ω in T (A) has already been
given in (10).
Recall that a geometric morphism f : S → T between topoi is a pair of adjoint functors,
consisting of a direct image part f∗ : S → T and an inverse image part f
∗ : T → S, of
which f∗ is required to preserve finite limits. Denote the category of elementary topoi and
geometric morphisms by Topos.9
Proposition 3 There is a functor T : CStar → Topos, defined on objects by T (A) =
SetsC(A), the category of functors from C(A) to the ambient topos.
This immediately follows from Theorem VII.2.2 in [63] (p. 359) and Proposition 2.
To close this subsection, note that instead of initially regarding C(A) as a poset as
in the main text, we could have considered it as a category from the start, having the
same objects, but with (equivalence classes of) monomorphisms as arrows (instead of
inclusions). The functor in Proposition 2 would then have the category Cat of categories
as its codomain. This would still have allowed us to define the associated topos, and also
the internal C*-algebra we will define below. From then on, most constructions will be
within the associated topos, and hence go through as well.
3.2 Bohrification
Whereas the previous subsection considered the topos T (A) associated to a C*-algebra A,
this one is devoted to a particular object A in this topos. In fact, the definition of A is
‘tautological’ in a literal sense.
Definition 4 Let A be a C*-algebra in Sets. The functor A : C(A) → Sets is given on
objects by
A(C) = C,
and on morphisms D ⊆ C of C(A) as the inclusion A(D) →֒ A(C).
Note that the functor A : C(A)→ Sets factors through CStar or cCstar via the forgetful
embedding of CStar or cCstar in the ambient topos Sets.
Theorem 5 A is a commutative C*-algebra in T (A) under the operations inherited from
A. More precisely, A is a vector space over the internal complex numbers Pt(C) (given
simply by the constant functor Pt(C) : C 7→ C) by
0: 1→ A 0C(∗) = 0,
+: A×A→ A a+C b = a+ b,
· : Pt(C)×A→ A z ·C a = z · a,
and an involutive algebra through
· : A×A→ A a ·C b = a · b,
(−)∗ : A→ A (a∗)C = a
∗.
9We will not worry about the fact that Topos, like Poset and CStar, is a large category; when pressed
one can limit these categories to a chosen universe to make them small.
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The norm relation is given by
N : A×Q+ → Ω NC(a, q) iff ‖a‖ < q.
Proof One easily checks that the arrows are natural transformations (and hence mor-
phisms in T (A)) and that this structure satisfies the requirements for A to be a pre-semi-
C*-algebra in T (A). Since each A(C) is a commutative C*-algebra in the ambient topos, A
is commutative as well. (Alternatively, since the definition of a commutative pre-semi-C*-
algebra consists only of geometrically definable objects (e.g.CQ) and geometric formulae
(see Appendix A and Section 2), it follows from Lemma 21 that A is a commutative pre-
semi-C*-algebra in T (A), because every A(C) is a commutative C*-algebra in the ambient
topos.)
In fact, A is a pre-C*-algebra, i.e. internally the semi-norm is a norm: if for all q > 0 we
have (a, q) ∈ N , then a = 0. To prove this, we need to show that C  ∀a∈Asa∀q∈Q+ .(a, q) ∈
N → a = 0, where we are using the internal language of T (A). In other words:
for all C ′ ⊇ C and a ∈ C ′, if C ′  ∀q∈Q+ .(a, q) ∈ N, then C
′  a = 0,
i.e. for all C ′ ⊇ C and a ∈ C ′, if for all C ′′ ⊇ C ′ and q ∈ Q+ we have C ′′  (a, q) ∈ N,
then C ′  a = 0,
i.e. for all C ′ ⊇ C and a ∈ C ′, if ‖a‖ = 0, then a = 0.
But this holds, since every C ′ is a C*-algebra.
Finally, A is in fact a C*-algebra, i.e. internally we have Cauchy completeness. By the
axiom of dependent choice (which holds because T (A) is a functor topos whose codomain
validates dependent choice [40]) it suffices to prove that every regular Cauchy sequence
(i.e. a sequence (xn) such that ||xn − xm|| 6 2
−n + 2−m for all n,m) converges. Thus we
need to prove
C  ∀n,m.||xn − xm|| 6 2
−n + 2−m → ∃x∈A.∀n.||x− xn|| 6 2
−n,
i.e. for all C ′ ⊇ C, if C ′  (∀n,m.‖xn − xm‖ 6 2
−n + 2−m),
then C ′  ∃x∈A.∀n.||x− xn|| 6 2
−n,
i.e. for all C ′ ⊇ C, if C ′  “x is regular”, then C ′  ∃x∈A.∀n.‖x− xn‖ 6 2
−n.
Once again, this holds because every C ′ is a C*-algebra. 
The functor A is our internal C*-algebra. By changing the universe of discourse from
the ambient topos Sets to T (A), the (generally) noncommutative C*-algebra A has be-
come a commutative C*-algebra A. Multiplication of two non-commuting operators is no
longer defined, since they live in different commutative subalgebras.10
10Kochen and Specker refer to such a structure as a partial algebra [56] and stress its relevance for the
foundations of quantum theory; in a partial algebra both addition and multiplication need only be defined
for commuting operators.
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3.3 The Kochen–Specker Theorem
Combining the material in Sections 2 and 3 so far, we obtain a mapping A 7→ Σ(A),
which associates a certain internal locale to a (generally) noncommutative C*-algebra.
As argued in the Introduction, Σ(A) describes the quantum logic of the physical system
whose algebra of observables is A.
An important property of the internal spectrum Σ is that it may typically be highly
non-spatial from an external point of view. First, recall (see Subsection 1.4) that a point
of a locale X in a topos T is a frame map O(X)→ Ω, where Ω is the subobject classifier
in T .
Theorem 6 Let H be a Hilbert space with dim(H) > 2 and let A be the C*-algebra of
bounded operators on H. Then the locale Σ(A) has no points.
Proof We reason internally. A point ρ : ∗ → Σ of the locale Σ (see Subsection 1.5) may
be combined with a ∈ Asa with Gelfand transform aˆ : Σ→ R (see (25)), so as to produce
a point aˆ ◦ ρ : ∗ → R of the locale R. This yields a map V ρ : Asa → Pt(R), which can be
shown to be an internal multiplicative functional; see [6, 7, 26].11 Being an arrow in T (A),
the map V ρ is a natural transformation, with components V ρ(C) : Asa(C) → Pt(R)(C);
by Definition 4 and (36), this is just V ρ(C) : Csa → R. Hence one has a multiplicative
functional V ρ(C) for each C ∈ C(A) in the usual sense, with the property (which follows
from naturality) that if C ⊆ D, then the restriction of V ρ(D) to Csa coincides with V ρ(C).
But this is precisely a valuation12 on B(H), whose nonexistence was proved by Kochen
and Specker [56]. 
This is a localic reformulation of the original topos-theoretic version of the Kochen-
Specker theorem due to Butterfield and Isham [20]. As in their work, the proof relies
on the original version, but in being a statement about the lack of models of a certain
theory, our reformulation has a logical thrust that both the original version by Kochen
and Specker and the reformulation by Butterfield and Isham lack.
The theorem certainly holds for more general C*-algebras than just the collection of
all bounded operators on a Hilbert space; see [31] and [46] for results on von Neumann
algebras. For C*-algebras, one has the result that a simple infinite unital C*-algebra
does not admit a dispersion-free quasi-state [44]. Evidently, Theorem 6 holds for such
extensions as well.
One way of looking at such results is to see them as illustrations of the failure of the
Krein-Milman theorem in a constructive context [68]. Indeed, recall that the classical
Krein-Milman theorem states that a compact convex set is the closed convex hull of its
extreme points. The state space of A is still a compact convex set in an appropriate localic
sense (see Section 4), and the pure states on A would be its extreme boundary. These
points, however, fail to exist, as we have just seen.
11This map may explicitly be given in the internal language of T (A), by noting that for each a ∈ Asa
the expression ρ˜(a) = (Lρ,a, Uρ,a) = ({r ∈ Q | ρ |= Da−r}, {s ∈ Q | ρ |= Ds−a}) is a Dedekind cut in T (A).
12This terminology is to be distinguished from the one used in Subsection 4.2 below. The naturality
property just mentioned is often called noncontextuality in the philosophy of physics literature.
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4 (Quasi-)states as integrals
This section about states, and the next one about observables, are both concerned with
connections between the two levels we have developed (see Figure 1):
1. the ambient topos Sets, containing the C*-algebra A;
2. the associated topos T (A), containing the internal commutative C*-algebra A and
its spectrum Σ.
The main result of this section is Theorem 14, which gives an isomorphism between quasi-
states on A at level 1 and, at level 2, either probability integrals on Asa, or, equivalently,
probability valuations on the Gelfand spectrum Σ. Subsequently, we show that probability
valuations define subobjects of Σ, as in classical physics.
All this requires some preparation, firstly in the theory of quasi-states on C*-algebras
(Subsection 4.1) and secondly in abstract constructive integration theory (Subsection 4.2).
4.1 States and quasi-states
A linear functional ρ : A → C on a C*-algebra A is called positive when ρ(a∗a) ≥ 0 for
all a ∈ A. It is a state when it is positive and satisfies ρ(1) = 1. A state ρ is pure when
ρ = tσ+(1− t)ω for some t ∈ (0, 1) and some states σ and ω implies ω = σ. Otherwise, it
is called mixed. For example, if A ⊆ B(H) for some Hilbert space H (which we may always
assume by the Gelfand–Naimark Theorem), then each unit vector Ψ ∈ H defines a state ψ
on A by ψ(a) = (Ψ, aΨ). If A = B(H), such states are pure. (If H is infinite-dimensional,
not all pure state arise in this way, though.) Mixed states ρ on B(H) arise from countable
sequences (pi), 0 6 pi 6 1,
∑
i pi = 1, coupled with an orthonormal family of vectors (Ψi),
through ρ(a) =
∑
i piψi(a). (By the spectral theorem, one may equivalently say that such
states are given by positive operators ρˆ on H with unit trace, through ρ(a) = Tr (ρˆa).) A
state ρ : A → C is called faithful when ρ(a∗a) = 0 implies a = 0. For example, if, in the
situation just described, the Ψi comprise an orthonormal basis of H and each pi > 0, then
the associated state ρ is faithful. The states of a C*-algebra form a compact convex set,
the extremal points of which are by definition the pure states. States are automatically
hermitian, in the sense that ρ(a∗) = ρ(a), or equivalently, ρ(a) ∈ R for self-adjoint a.
In algebraic quantum physics, mathematical states as defined above are often used to
model the physical states of the quantum system. However, when taking Bohr’s doctrine
of classical concepts seriously, one should take into account that two observables can only
be added in a physically meaningful way when they are jointly measurable, i.e. when
the corresponding operators commute. Thus one may relax the definition of a quantum
state, which ought to be linear only on commutative parts. This leads to the notion of a
quasi-state [1]:13
13Axiom VII of Mackey’s foundation of quantum mechanics [64] states that a measure on the projections
of a von Neumann algebra extends to a state on the von Neumann algebra. Mackey stresses that, in contrast
to his other axioms, Axiom VII does not have a physical justification. One can prove that a measure extends
to a quasi-state, so one is led to ask whether every quasi-state is a state. This is not the case when the
von Neumann algebra has a summand of type I2, but it holds for all other von Neumann algebras [15].
For C*-algebras the question is more difficult. The main result seems to be the following [16]. Consider a
C*-algebra with no quotient isomorphic to M2(C) and let ρ be a quasi-linear functional. Then ρ is linear
iff ρ restricted to the unit ball is uniformly weakly continuous.
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Definition 7 A quasi-linear functional on a C*-algebra A is a map ρ : A → C that is
linear on all commutative subalgebras and satisfies ρ(a + ib) = ρ(a) + iρ(b) for all self-
adjoint a, b ∈ A (possibly non-commuting). It is called positive when ρ(a∗a) ≥ 0 for all
a ∈ A. When A is unital, a positive quasi-linear functional is called a quasi-state when
ρ(1) = 1.
This kind of quasi-linearity also determines when some property P of the C*-algebra
A descends to a corresponding property P of the internal C*-algebra A, as the following
lemma shows. To be precise, for P ⊆ A, define a subfunctor of A by P (C) = P ∩ C. Let
us call a property P ⊆ A quasi-linear when a ∈ P and b ∈ P imply µa + iλb ∈ P for all
µ, λ ∈ R and a, b ∈ Asa.
Lemma 8 Let A be a C*-algebra, and let P ⊆ A be a quasi-linear property. Then P = A
if and only if P = A.
Proof One implication is trivial; for the other, suppose that P = A. For a ∈ A, denote by
C∗(a) the sub-C*-algebra generated by a. When a is self-adjoint, C∗(a) is commutative.
So Asa ⊆ P , whence by quasi-linearity of P and the unique decomposition of elements in
a real and imaginary part, we have A ⊆ P . 
4.2 Algebraic integration theory
The well-known correspondence between states on commutative C*-algebras A and prob-
ability measures on the underlying Gelfand spectrum Σ is an immediate consequence of
the Gelfand isomorphism A ∼= C(Σ,C) and the Riesz-Markov representation theorem in
measure theory. In the present topos-theoretical setting, it turns out to be more natural
to work with integrals and valuations rather than measures. Recall the a priori difference
between these three concepts:
• measures are defined on Borel subsets of some space X;
• valuations are defined only on the open subsets of X;
• integrals are positive linear functionals on the (ordered) vector space Cc(X,R).
Classically, if X is locally compact Hausdorff and the measures in question are suitably
regular, there are isomorphisms between these notions. From a constructive point of view,
however, there is a subtle difference between valuations and integrals.14 In any case,
the fundamental role locales play in this paper as the Gelfand spectra of the internal
C*-algebras A makes it quite natural to assign probabilities to opens (rather than Borel
subsets) of the spectrum.
14The integral I(f) of a function f ∈ C(X) is a Dedekind real, so that it can be approximated by
rationals. This may not be the case for the valuation µ(U) of an open U , as the ‘kissing’ property (if r < s
then µ(U) < s or r < µ(U)) may fail. Accordingly, µ(U) is only a lower real, and can be thought of as
a predicate r < µ(U) on the rationals. This predicate is downward closed: if r < µ(U) and s 6 r, then
s < µ(U). But in general, given ε > 0 one cannot approximate µ(U) up to ε with rationals. Given an
integral I , we can define a corresponding valuation µI(U) by taking the sup of I(f) over all 0 6 f 6 1
with support in U . It is remarkable that for any valuation µ one can conversely find a (unique) integral
I such that µ = µI . So despite the fact that one may not be able to compute µ(U), it is still possible to
compute
R
fdµ as a Dedekind real, which a priori is only a lower real.
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The following string of definitions gives an abstract (and constructive) version of inte-
gration theory based on ordered vector spaces, abstracting from the Riemann, Lebesgue
and Daniell integrals [29, 30, 75]. Several axiomatizations are possible, of which the one
in terms of so-called f-algebras is the most convenient for our purposes.
Definition 9 A Riesz space or vector lattice is a partially ordered vector space (R,6) over
R (i.e. a real vector space R with partial ordering 6 such that f 6 g implies f +h 6 g+h
for all h and f ≥ 0 implies rf ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R+) that is a distributive lattice with respect
to its partial order [62, Definition 11.1].
An f-algebra is a commutative, unital, real algebra R whose underlying vector space
is a Riesz space in which f, g ≥ 0 implies fg ≥ 0, and f ∧ g = 0 implies hf ∧ g = 0 for
all h ≥ 0. Moreover, the multiplicative unit 1 has to be strong in the sense that for each
f ∈ R there exists a natural number n such that −n1 6 f 6 n1 [82, Definition 140.8].
Note that although f-algebras are a priori defined over the real numbers, they can a fortiori
be defined over Q as well.
The self-adjoint part of any commutative C*-algebra A is an example of an f-algebra
by defining a 6 b in the usual way (i.e.iff ∃c∈A[b − a = c
∗c]); one has f ∨ g = max{f, g}
and f ∧ g = min{f, g}. Conversely, by the Stone-Yosida representation theorem every
f-algebra can be densely embedded in a space of real continuous functions on a compact
space.
Definition 10 An integral on an ordered vector space R is a linear functional I : R→ R
that is positive, i.e. if f ≥ 0 then also I(f) ≥ 0. If R has a strong unit 1 ( e.g., the
multiplicative unit in the case of f-algebras), then an integral I satisfying I(1) = 1 is called
a probability integral. An integral is faithful when its kernel is {0}, i.e., when I(f) = 0
and f ≥ 0 imply f = 0.
Except in the degenerate case I(1) = 0, any integral can obviously be normalised to
a probability integral. The prime example of an integral is the Riemann or Lebesgue
integral on the ordered vector space C[0, 1]. More generally, any positive linear functional
on a commutative C*-algebra provides an example, states yielding probability integrals.
We wish to use a certain generalization of the Riesz-Markov theorem that can be
proved constructively [29] and hence can be used within our topos T (A). This requires a
localic reformulation of Definition 9, as well as a similar approach to valuations.
Let R be an f-algebra (in Sets, for the moment). In defining the following frame it is
technically convenient to define R as a vector space over Q. Define Integral(R) as the
distributive lattice freely generated by Pf , f ∈ R, subject to the relations
P1 = ⊤,
Pf ∧ P−f = ⊥,
Pf+g 6 Pf ∨ Pg,
Pf = ⊥ (for f 6 0).
This lattice generates a frame O(I(R)) by adding the regularity condition
P(f) =
∨
Q∋q>0
P(f − q) (40)
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to the relations above, just like (23) in the case of the spectrum. It can be shown (cf.
(17)) that
Pf = {ρ : R→ R | ρ(f) > 0}, (41)
where each ρ is understood to be a positive linear functional. Models of this theory, i.e.
points of the associated locale, precisely correspond to probability integrals on R; if I is
such an integral, the associated model mI is given by mI(Pf ) = 1 iff I(f) > 0. Conversely,
a model m defines an integral Im by (compare with the proof of Theorem 6)
Im(f) := ({p | m |= Pf−p}, {q | m |= Pq−f}),
where the right-hand side is seen to be a Dedekind real from the relations on P•. All this
may be internalized to any topos, where, of course, there is no a priori guarantee that
points of the locale with frame O(I(R)) exist (and hence that expressions like (41) make
good sense).
The final ingredient of the constructive Riesz-Markov theorem is the definition of a
locale of valuations. These were studied in [45] and [81].
Definition 11 A probability valuation on a locale X is a monotone map µ : O(X) →
[0, 1]l that satisfies the usual additivity and regularity conditions for measures, i.e. µ(U)+
µ(V ) = µ(U ∧ V ) + µ(U ∨ V ) and µ(
∨
λ Uλ) =
∨
λ µ(Uλ) for any directed family. (Here,
[0, 1]l is the collection of lower reals between 0 and 1.)
Like integrals, probability valuations on X organize themselves in a locale V(X).
The generalized Riesz-Markov Theorem, then, is as follows.
Theorem 12 [29] Let R be an f-algebra and let Σ be its spectrum.15 Then the locales
I(R) and V(Σ) are isomorphic. To obtain an integral from a valuation we define:
Iµf := (sup(si)
∑
siµ(si < f < si+1), inf(si)
∑
si+1(1− µ(si > f)− µ(f > si+1)),
where (s < f) is a notation for Df−s and (s < f < t) denotes Df−s ∧ Dt−f and si is a
partition of [a, b] such that a 6 f 6 b. Conversely, to obtain a valuation from an integral
I we define:
µI(Da) := sup
{
I(na+ ∧ 1)|n ∈ N
}
.
Note that both locales in question are compact regular [29]. Logically speaking, the
theorem follows from the existence of a bi-interpretation between the geometric theories
Integral(R) and Valuation(Σ) (i.e. there are interpretation maps in two directions which
are each other’s inverses) and the equivalence of the category of propositional geometric
theories with interpretations to the category of frames.
4.3 From states on A to subobjects of O(Σ)
We return to our main topic. Since everything in this section so far may be interpreted in
the internal language of a topos and the proof of Theorem 12 is constructive, we have:
15See [26] for the notion of the spectrum of an f-algebra, which is described exactly as in Subsection
2.2. If the f-algebra is the self-adjoint part of a commutative C*-algebra, then its spectrum as an f-algebra
coincides with its spectrum as a C*-algebra.
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Corollary 13 Let A be a C*-algebra with Bohrification A and associated Gelfand spec-
trum Σ in the topos T (A). Then the locale I(A) of probability integrals on Asa is homeo-
morphic to the locale V(Σ) of probability valuations on Σ.
As announced at the beginning of this section, the next theorem crosses two levels of
Figure 1.
Theorem 14 There is a bijective correspondence between quasi-states on A and either
probability integrals on Asa, or, equivalently, probability valuations on its Gelfand spectrum
Σ.
This theorem may actually be extended to a correspondence between (faithful) positive
quasi-linear functionals on A and (faithful) integrals on A, etc.
Proof Every positive quasi-linear functional ρ gives a natural transformation Iρ : Asa → R
if we define its components (Iρ)C : Csa → R to be ρ|Csa (i.e. the restriction of ρ to
Csa ⊆ Asa).
Conversely, let I : Asa → R be an integral. Define ρ : Asa → R by
ρ(a) = IC∗(a)(a).
For commuting a, b ∈ Asa,
ρ(a+ b) = IC∗(a+b)(a+ b)
= IC∗(a,b)(a+ b)
= IC∗(a,b)(a) + IC∗(a,b)(b)
= IC∗(a)(a) + IC∗(b)(b)
= ρ(a) + ρ(b),
because I is a natural transformation, C∗(a) ∪ C∗(b) ⊆ C∗(a, b) ⊇ C∗(a + b), and I is
locally linear. Moreover, ρ is positive because I is locally positive (see Lemma 8). Hence
we have defined ρ on Asa and may extend it to A by complex linearity. It is clear that the
two maps I 7→ ρ and ρ 7→ I and are inverses of each other and that if I is a probability
integral, then ρ is a quasi-state, and vice versa. 
In the Introduction, we have seen that in the classical case a (pure) state ρ defines a
subobject [ρ] of the frame of opens of the classical phase space; see (3). As we shall
now show, this remains true, mutatis mutandis, in the quantum case. The main technical
difficulty is to adapt the condition δρ(V ) = 1 in (3).
Theorem 14 yields a bijective correspondence between quasi-states ρ on A and prob-
ability valuations µρ on Σ. Fix a state, or quasi-state, ρ on A. The logical formula
µρ(−) = 1 (of the Mitchell-Be´nabou language of T (A)) is a predicate on O(Σ) and hence
defines a subobject [ρ] of O(Σ) with characteristic arrow χ[ρ] : O(Σ) → Ω. This arrow is
just the interpretation of µρ(−) = 1, i.e.
χ[ρ] = Jµρ(−) = 1K. (42)
Compare with (3); beyond mimicking the notation, we see that we have been able to
transfer the classical description of states to the quantum situation in every respect.
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5 Observables and propositions
In this section and the next we give the details of steps 2 to 5 of our five-step program
for spatial quantum logic; cf. Subsections 1.2 and 1.6. We start with the locale map
δ(a) : Σ→ IR, then turn to the description of elementary propositions a ∈ ∆ as opens in
the spectrum Σ, and finally consider the pairing of states and propositions to arrive at a
suitable notion of (multi-valued) truth in quantum theory.
5.1 Interval domain
For a commutative unital C*-algebra A with Gelfand spectrum Σ in Sets, the Gelfand
transform of a ∈ Asa is a continuous function aˆ : Σ→ R. Equivalently, it is a locale map
(25). As we have seen in Subsection 2.3, mutatis mutandis the description (25) still applies
when A is a commutative unital C*-algebra A with Gelfand spectrum Σ in a topos T . In
particular, one has the Gelfand transform
aˆ : Σ→ R (a ∈ Asa). (43)
Our problem, however, is to express an element a ∈ Asa of a noncommutative C*-algebra
A in Sets in terms of some locale map δ(a) defined on the spectrum Σ of the Bohrification
A of A in T (A). As we shall see, this problem can be solved if we introduce some fuzziness,
in that δ(a) no longer takes values in the internal Dedekind reals R in T (A), like aˆ, but
in the so-called interval domain IR, internalized in T (A) as IR. Thus, apart from (43) we
are dealing with a second locale map
δ(a) : Σ→ IR (a ∈ Asa). (44)
In honour of Do¨ring and Isham, we refer to δ(a) as the Daseinisation of a (although our
map differs from theirs, cf. Appendix B).
We have already encountered Scott’s interval domain IR in Subsection 1.8 as the
poset of compact intervals in R, ordered by inverse inclusion. Like the Dedekind real
numbers, the interval domain is easily internalized and hence definable in any topos. In
fact, the construction of the Dedekind real numbers in Subsection 2.3 only requires a
single modification so as to obtain the interval domain: the corresponding frame O(IR) is
defined by the very same generators (p, q) and relations as O(R), except that the fourth
relation (i.e. (p, q) = (p, q1) ∨ (p1, q) if p 6 p1 6 q1 6 q) is dropped. The models of
O(IR) or points of the associated locale IR again correspond to pairs (L,U) given by (31)
and (32), but this time such a pair may fail to define a Dedekind cut; axiomatically, only
the ‘kissing’ requirement no longer holds. In any topos T , we denote the locale defined
by the geometric propositional theory given by the first three axioms in the list following
(30) in Subsection 2.3 — interpreted in T — by O(IR)T , with the usual special case
IR ≡ IRT (A). Similarly, the subobject of P(Q) × P(Q) consisting of models of O(IR)T is
denoted by Pt(IR)T , with Pt(IR)T (A) ≡ Pt(IR).
The examples in Subsection 2.3 now read as follows:
1. In Sets (or, more generally, when classical logic applies in T ), a cut (L,U) defines a
compact interval [supL, inf U ] (where sup and inf are taken in R), so that Pt(IR) may
be identified with the classical Scott interval domain IR. In that case, a generator
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(p, q) ∈ O(IR) may be identified with the Scott open in IR that contains all intervals
[a, b] such that p < a 6 b < q.
2. In a topos Sh(X) of sheaves one has
O(R)Sh(X) : U 7→ O(U × IR), (45)
but its points are not as easily described as (34); instead, one has
Pt(IR) : U 7→ {(f, g) | f, g : U → R | f 6 g, f lower-semicont., g upper-semicont.}.
(46)
This follows by carefully adapting the proof of [63, Theorem VI.8.2] for R.
3. In particular, for T (A) = SetsC(A), one has
O(IR) : C 7→ O((↑C)× IR), (47)
which may be identified with the set of monotone functions from ↑C to O(IR).16
The object Pt(IR) will not be used in this paper.17
5.2 Daseinisation
After this preparation, we turn to the Daseinisation (44), or rather to the corresponding
frame map
δ(a)−1 : O(IR)→ O(Σ). (48)
A complete description of this map, based on the technique of generating (semi)lattices
for frames, may be found in Appendix A.2. Here, we just look at the special case
(1
δ(a)−1(r,s)
//O(Σ)) = (1
(r,s)
−→ O(IR)
δ(a)−1
−→ O(Σ)), (49)
where the arrow (r, s) : 1→ O(IR) maps into the monotone function with constant value
↓ (r, s).18 We may even simplify (49) even further by localizing it at C · 1; this, however,
entails no loss of generality, for O(Σ)(C · 1) is the frame in Sets that (together with the
frame map (88)) provides the external description of the internal locale Σ in T (A) (see
Subsection 1.7 and Appendix A.2).
The quantity δ(a)−1(r, s)(C · 1) is a global element U of O(Σ)(C · 1) as described by
Theorem 29 in the Appendix. Briefly, this theorem states that O(Σ)(C · 1) may be seen
as the set of all subfunctors U of the functor C 7→ LC that satisfy a certain regularity
condition, where LC is the distributive lattice freely generated by the formal symbols Dc,
c ∈ Csa subject to the relations (18)–(22) (simply interpreted in Sets).
19 Abbreviating
δ(a)−1(r, s) = δ(a)−1(r, s)(C · 1), (50)
16The argument is the same as for R, see footnote 7.
17For completeness, we mention that Pt(IR)(C) is the set of all pairs (L,U), where L and U are sub-
functors of the constant functor Q, truncated to ↑C ⊂ C(A), such that for all D ⊇ C, (L(D), U(D)) is a
pair of the form (31)–(32).
18Here (r, s) is seen as an element of the generating semilattice Q ×< Q, whereas ↓ (r, s) is its image in
the frame O(IR) through the canonical map (67); see the Appendix.
19See Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the functor C 7→ LC .
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the ensuing element δ(a)−1(r, s) of O(Σ)(C · 1) turns out to be the functor
δ(a)−1(r, s) : C 7→ {Df−r ∧Ds−g | f, g ∈ Csa, f 6 a 6 g}. (51)
This follows from (106) and the definition of δ(a)−1 in Appendix A.2, combined with the
equality
⋃
{p<q|(p,q)⊆(r,s)}
{Df−p∧Dq−g | f, g ∈ Csa, f 6 a 6 g} = {Df−r∧Ds−g | f, g ∈ Csa, f 6 a 6 g}.
An alternative description of δ(a)−1 is as follows. For fixed a ∈ Asa, define functors
La ∈ T (A) and Ua ∈ T (A) by
La(C) = {f ∈ Csa | f 6 a};
Ua(C) = {g ∈ Csa | a 6 g}. (52)
Each of these defines a subobject of Asa. In fact, the pair (La, Ua) is a directed subobject
of Asa × A
op
sa . Now take a generator (r, s) of O(IR), and write (r, s) = (−∞, s) ∧ (r,∞).
The Gelfand transform (27) defines subobjects ·ˆ(La, (r,∞)) and ·ˆ(Ua, (−∞, s)) of O(Σ).
We then put
δ(a)−1 : (r, s) 7→
∨
·ˆ(La, (r,∞)) ∧ ·ˆ(Ua, (−∞, s)). (53)
Using (28) and (29), this gives20
δ(a)−1(r, s) =
∨
f∈La,g∈Ua
Df−r ∧ Ds−g. (54)
To illustrate what is going on, it is helpful to compute the right-hand side of (51) or
(54) in Sets for A = C = C(Σ,C). In that case the meaning of Da is given by (17), so
that with ρ(f) = f(ρ) one finds Df−r = {ρ ∈ Σ | f(ρ) > r} and Ds−g = {ρ ∈ Σ | g(ρ) < s}.
One then obtains (with ∧ for ‘and’)
δ(a)−1A (r, s) =
⋃
f,g∈Csa,f6a6g
{ρ ∈ Σ | f(ρ) > r ∧ g(ρ) < s}
= {ρ ∈ Σ | ∃f6a[f(ρ) > r ∧ f(ρ) < s] ∧ ∃g≥a[g(ρ) > r ∧ g(ρ) < s]}
= {ρ ∈ Σ | r < a(ρ) < s}
= a−1(r, s). (55)
To close this subsection, we note the following.
Proposition 15 The map δ : Asa → C(Σ, IR) is injective, and a 6 b iff δ(a) 6 δ(b).
Proof Suppose that δ(a) = δ(b). Then for all C ∈ C(A), the sets La(C) = {f ∈ Csa |
f 6 a} and Ua(C) = {g ∈ Csa | a 6 g} must coincide with Lb(C) and Ub(C), respectively.
Imposing these equalities at C = C∗(a) and at C = C∗(b) yields a = b. The order in
Asa is clearly preserved by δ, whereas the converse implication can be shown by the same
method as the first claim of the proposition. 
20Using a generic point σ, we may even define
δ(a)(σ) := (supσ(La), inf σ(Ua)).
Analoguously, one can view δ(a) as an interpretation of the geometric theory Σ in the geometric theory of
the intervals; see [29].
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5.3 Propositions
It immediately follows from the existence of the Daseinisation map (48) (see Subsection
5.2 and Appendix A.2) that, as in the classical case, elementary propositions a ∈ ∆ define
opens in phase space. For an open in the ‘quantum phase space’ Σ is simply defined as a
global element 1→ O(Σ) (cf. Subsection 1.4)), so that given an observable a ∈ Asa and a
Scott open ∆ ∈ O(IR), we may combine the corresponding arrows δ(a)−1 : O(IR)→ O(Σ)
and ∆ : 1→ O(IR) into
(1
[a∈∆]
//O(Σ)) = (1
∆
//O(IR)
δ(a)−1
//O(Σ)). (56)
This generalises (49); in particular, ∆ : 1 → O(IR) is defined at C as the monotone
function ↑C → O(IR) taking constant value ∆. In other words,
[a ∈ ∆] = δ(a)−1 ◦∆. (57)
6 State-proposition pairing
In Subsection 4.3 we have shown how a state ρ on A gives rise to a subobject [ρ] of O(Σ)
defined by the predicate µρ(−) = 1, and hence to an arrow O(Σ)
χ[ρ]
//Ω related to the
predicate in question by (42).
Also, we have just seen the description (56) of propositions a ∈ ∆ as opens in Σ. Hence
we can pair a physical state ρ and a physical proposition a ∈ ∆ by composition, to end up
with a ‘truth value’ 〈a ∈ ∆, ρ〉 in the subobject classifier Ω of T (A). Explicitly, one has
1
〈a∈∆,ρ〉
//Ω = 1
[a∈∆]
//O(Σ)
χ[ρ]
//Ω, (58)
or
〈a ∈ ∆, ρ〉 = χ[ρ] ◦ δ(a)
−1 ◦∆. (59)
In what follows, we need the basic definitions of Kripke-Joyal semantics. If ϕ is some
formula interpreted in a topos T as an arrow JϕK : F → Ω, and α : B → F is any arrow in
T (defining a ‘generalized element’ of F ), then the notation B  ϕ(α), or, less precisely,
B  ϕ (for ‘B forces ϕ’) means that the composite arrow B
α
→ F
JϕK
−→ Ω factors through
⊤ : 1 → Ω. In a functor topos SetsC, where C is some category, the notation C  ϕ for
some C ∈ C is shorthand for y(C)  ϕ, where y(C) : D 7→ HomC(D,C) is the Yoneda
functor. In our case T = T (A), the interpretation JϕK is a natural transformation F → Ω,
given by its components JϕK(C) : F (C)→ Ω(C), where C ∈ C(A). In that case the forcing
condition C  ϕ turns out to be equivalent to JϕK(C)(F (C)) = ⊤C , where ⊤C is the
maximal upper set on C.
Using the Kripke-Joyal semantics of T (A), we now explicitly compute the state-
proposition pairing in case that ∆ = (r, s) is a rational interval. The computation is
straightforward when using generating lattices (see Appendix). From here on, ρ is a fixed
state on A and we abbreviate µρ by µ. For D ∈ C(A),
(〈a ∈ (r, s), ρ〉)D(∗)
(58)
= (χ[ρ] ◦ [a ∈ (r, s)])D(∗)
(57),(42)
= Jµ(δ(a)−1(r, s)) = 1K(D).
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Being a global element 1→ Ω of the subobject classifier Ω of T (A), the right-hand side is
an element of the set Ω(D), and hence an upper set on D. With slight abuse of notation,
we simply call the latter 〈a ∈ (r, s), ρ〉(D). It follows that
〈a ∈ (r, s), ρ〉(D) = {C ∈ C(A) | C ⊇ D,C  µ(δ(a)−1(r, s)) = 1}, (60)
where µ ◦ δ(a)−1(−) = 1 is the obvious predicate on O(IR) defined by µ(−) = 1 on O(Σ)
and the Daseinisation map (48). Since 〈a ∈ (r, s), ρ〉(D) is the truncation to ↑D of the
corresponding upper set at C · 1, we may use (51) or (54), from which we see that the
forcing condition C  µ(δ(a)−1(r, s)) = 1 is equivalent to
µC

 ∨
f6a6g, f,g∈Csa
Df−r ∧ Ds−g

 = 1.
Here µC is the valuation defined as µρ, but with ρ restricted to C. Similarly, Df−r refers
to an open in the spectrum of C (cf. Theorem 20, according to which the Da with a ∈ Csa
may be seen as generators of the spectrum of C). Since the measure of the intersection of
two opens equals one if the measures of both opens do, this means (for f, g ∈ Csa)
µC



∨
f6a
Df−r

 ∧

∨
g≥a
Ds−g



 = 1,
which happens if and only if
µC

∨
f6a
Df−r

 = 1 and µC

∨
g≥a
Ds−g

 = 1.
The left conjunct means
∀n∈N ∃f∈Csa, f6a [µC(Df−r) > 1−
1
n
], (61)
since T (A) is a functor topos and hence the quantifiers above are interpreted locally. The
construction of µρ from ρ (see Section 4) implies
µC(Dh) = lim
m→∞
ρ((mh+) ∧ 1),
where the limit is a lower real. In other words, µC(Dh) > q iff there exists m in N such
that ρ((mh+)∧ 1) > q. So C  µρ(
∨
f6a Df−r) = 1 means that for each n ∈ N there exists
f ∈ C with f 6 a and µC(Df−r) > 1−
1
n
.
Hence at the end of the day the state-proposition pairing 〈a ∈ (r, s), ρ〉 explicitly yields
the upper set at D given by
〈a ∈ (r, s), ρ〉(D) = (62)
C ∈ C(A) | C ⊇ D,µC

 ∨
f6a,f∈Csa
Df−r

 = 1 and µC

 ∨
a6g,g∈Csa
Ds−g

 = 1

 .
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This formula can be put in a slightly more palpable form when A and each C ∈ C(A)
are von Neumann algebras (in the ambient topos Sets). In that case, it can be shown
[46] that the open Df−r in the spectrum corresponds to a projection operator [Df−r], to
which we can directly apply the state ρ. Moreover, unlike for general C*-algebras, the
supremum P =
∨
{[Df−r] | f 6 a, f ∈ Csa} exists. One then simply has µC(P ) = 1 when
ρ(P ) = 1. Similarly, the projection Q =
∨
{[Ds−g] | a 6 g, g ∈ Csa} exists and µC(Q) = 1
when ρ(Q) = 1.
To close, we remark that one might consider a proposition µρ(−) > p, for some rational
number p, instead of the proposition µρ(−) = 1 as in this paper. This would simplify the
computations above slightly. For instance, (61) would become
∃f∈Csa, f6a [µC(Df−r) > p].
This eliminates a universal quantification, but otherwise the computations would continue
mutatis mutandis as before.
A Generating lattices for frames
At various places in this article we refer to a presentation of a frame (or locale) by a gen-
erating lattice with a covering relation. This technique has been developed in the context
of formal topology [71, 72], and extends an analogous construction due to Johnstone [48].
Note that formal topology may be developed in the framework of constructive set theory
[3], and hence may be internalized in topos theory.
Let (L,6) be a meet semilattice (i.e. a poset in which any pair of elements has a meet
= g.l.b. = infimum; in most of our applications (L,6) is actually a distributive lattice).
Definition 16 A covering relation on L is a relation ⊳⊆ L × P(L) - equivalently, a
function L→ P(P(L)) - written x ⊳ U when (x,U) ∈⊳, such that:
1. If x ∈ U then x ⊳ U ;
2. If x ⊳ U and U ⊳ V (i.e. y ⊳ V for all y ∈ U) then x ⊳ V ;
3. If x ⊳ U then x ∧ y ⊳ U ;
4. If x ∈ U and x ∈ V , then x ⊳ U ∧ V (where U ∧ V = {x ∧ y | x ∈ U, y ∈ V }).
For example, if (L,6) = (O(X),⊆) one may take x ⊳ U iff x 6
∨
U , i.e. iff U covers x.
Let DL be the poset of all lower sets in L, ordered by inclusion; this is a frame [48,
§1.2]. The structure ⊳ gives rise to a closure operation21 A : DL→ DL, given by
AU = {x ∈ L | x ⊳ U}, (63)
which has the following properties: ↓U ⊆ AU , U ⊆ AV ⇒ AU ⊆ AV , AU ∩ AV ⊆
A(↓U ∩ ↓V ). The frame F(L,⊳) generated by such a structure is then defined by
F(L,⊳) = {U ∈ DL | AU = U} = {U ∈ P(L) | x ⊳ U ⇒ x ∈ U}; (64)
21As a map, A is also defined on P(L). Let χ⊳ : L × P(L) → Ω be the characteristic function of the
subset ⊳⊆ L× P(L). Then A = χˆ⊳ is just the ‘curry’ or ‘λ-conversion’ of χ⊳ .
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the second equality follows because firstly the property AU = U guarantees that U ∈ DL,
and secondly one has AU = U iff x ⊳ U implies x ∈ U . An equivalent description of
F(L,⊳) is
F(L,⊳) ∼= P(L)/ ∼, (65)
where U ∼ V iff U ⊳ V and V ⊳ U . Indeed, the map U 7→ [U ] from F(L,⊳) (as defined
in (64)) to P(L)/ ∼ is a frame map with inverse [U ] 7→ AU ; hence the idea behind the
isomorphism (65) is that the map A picks a unique representative in the equivalence class
[U ], namely AU .
The frame F(L,⊳) comes equipped with a canonical map
f : L → F(L,⊳); (66)
x 7→ A(↓x), (67)
which satisfies f(x) 6
∨
f(U) if x ⊳ U . In fact, f is universal with this property, in that
any homomorphism g : L→ G of meet semilattices into a frame G such that g(x) 6
∨
g(U)
whenever x ⊳ U has a factorisation g = ϕ◦f for some unique frame map ϕ : F(L,C)→ G.
This suggests that the point of the construction is that F(L,⊳) is (isomorphic to) a frame
defined by generators and relations, provided the covering relation is suitably defined in
terms of the relations. More precisely [3, Thm. 12]:
Proposition 17 Suppose one has a frame F and a meet semilattice22 L with a map
f : L→ F of meet semilattices that generates F in the sense that for each U ∈ F one has
U =
∨
{f(x) | x ∈ L, f(x) ≤ U}. Define a cover relation ⊳ on L by
x ⊳ U iff f(x) 6
∨
f(U). (68)
Then one has a frame isomorphism F ∼= F(L,⊳).
We now turn to maps between frames.
Definition 18 Let (L,⊳) and (M,◭) be meet semilattices with covering relation as above,
and let f∗ : L→ P(M) be such that:
1. f∗(L) =M ;23
2. f∗(x) ∧ f∗(y)◭ f∗(x ∧ y);
3. x ⊳ U ⇒ f∗(x)◭ f∗(U) (where f∗(U) =
⋃
u∈U f(U)).
Define two such maps f∗1 , f
∗
2 to be equivalent if f
∗
1 (x) ∼ f
∗
2 (x) (i.e. f
∗
1 (x)◭ f
∗
2 (x) and
f∗2 (x)◭ f
∗
1 (x)) for all x ∈ L. A continuous map f : (M,◭) → (L,⊳) is an equivalence
class of such maps f∗ : L→ P(M).24
22This even works in case that L is just a set preordered by x 6 y when f(x) 6 f(y).
23If L and M have top elements ⊤L and ⊤M , respectively, then this condition may be replaced by
f∗(⊤L) = ⊤M .
24 Instead of taking equivalence classes, one could demand as a fourth condition that f∗(x) = Af∗(x)
for all x ∈ L.
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Our main interest in continuous maps lies in the following result.25
Proposition 19 Each continuous map f : (M,◭)→ (L,⊳) is equivalent to a frame map
F(f) : F(L,⊳)→ F(M,◭), given by
F(f) : U 7→ Af∗(U). (69)
All results in this subsection may be internalized in any topos; for example, a covering
relation on an internal meet semilattice L in a topos T is simply a subobject ⊳ of L×ΩL,
where Ω is the subobject classifier in T . The defining properties of a covering relation are
then interpreted in the internal language of T . Proposition 19 holds in this generality,
since its proof is constructive; see especially [3].
A.1 Localization of the spectrum
We now consider some applications pertinent to the main body of the paper. First,
we return to the Gelfand spectrum in Subsection 2.2. In its presentation by means of
generators and relations, eqs. (18)–(22) play a different role from the regularity rule (23),
and we will treat the latter separately. First, for an arbitrary unital commutative C*-
algebra A in some topos, consider the distributive lattice LA freely generated by the
formal symbols Da, a ∈ Asa (i.e. a is a variable of type Asa), subject to the relations
(18)–(22). As shown in [26, 30], LA can be described more explicitly, as follows.
Let A+ := {a ∈ Asa | a ≥ 0}. Define p 4 q iff there exists n ∈ N such that p 6 nq.
Define p ≈ q iff p 4 q and q 4 p. The lattice operations on A respect ≈ and hence A+/ ≈
is a lattice. We then have
LA ∼= A
+/ ≈ . (70)
The image of the generator Da in LA, seen as an element of A
+/ ≈, may also be described
explicitly: decomposing a ∈ Asa as a = a
+ − a− with a± ∈ A+ in the usual way, under
the isomorphism (70) this image coincides with the equivalence class [a+] in A+/ ≈. In
explicit computations [47, 46], one may therefore simply identify LA with A
+/ ≈ and Da
(seen as an element of LA) with [a
+], respectively. Such computations are also greatly
facilitated by the following ‘locality’ theorem.
Theorem 20 For each C ∈ C(A) one has
LA(C) = LC , (71)
where the right-hand side is simply defined in Sets (where it may be computed through
(70)). Furthermore, if C ⊆ D, then the map LA(C)→ LA(D) given by the functoriality of
LA simply maps each generator Dc for c ∈ Csa to the same generator for the spectrum of D
(this is well defined because c ∈ Dsa, and this inclusion preserves the relations (18)–(22));
we write this as LC →֒ LD.
25 In fact, one may extend this into an equivalence F between the category of formal topologies and the
category of frames. A formal topology is a generalization of the above triples (L,6,⊳), where 6 is merely
required to be a preorder. In this more general case, the axioms on the cover relation ⊳ take a slightly
different form. See [8, 69].
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A proof of this theorem by explicit computation may be found in [22, Thm. 5.2.3].
Here, we give an alternative proof, which requires some familiarity with geometric logic
[63, 51, 80].26 It relies on the following lemmas.
Lemma 21 Let T be a geometric theory. For any category C, there is an isomorphism
of categories Mod(T,SetsC) ∼= Mod(T,Sets)C.
Here Mod(T,T ) is the category of T-models in T .27 This lemma may be found in [51,
Corollary D.1.2.14].
Lemma 22 The lattice LA generating the spectrum of an internal commutative C*-algebra
A is preserved under inverse images of geometric morphisms.
To prove the second lemma, we first use the characterization of the real part Asa of a
commutative C*-algebra A as an f-algebra over the rationals (see Definition 9). Moreover,
the spectrum of a C*-algebra coincides with the spectrum of the f-algebra of its self-
adjoint elements [28]. We claim that the theory of f-algebras is geometric. First, we
observe that an f-algebra is precisely a uniquely divisible lattice ordered ring [26, p151],
since unique divisibility turns a ring into a Q-algebra. The definition of a lattice ordered
ring is algebraic: it can be written using equations only. The theory of torsion-free rings,
i.e. (nx = 0 ⊢x x = 0) for all n > 0, is also algebraic. The theory of divisible rings is
obtained by adding infinitely many geometric axioms ⊤ ⊢x ∃yny = x, one for each n > 0,
to the algebraic theory of rings. A torsion-free divisible ring is the same as a uniquely
divisible ring: Suppose that ny = x and nz = x, then n(y − z) = 0, and so y − z = 0.
We conclude that the theory of uniquely divisible lattice ordered rings, i.e. f-algebras, is
geometric. In particular, Asa and hence A
+ are definable by a geometric theory. Secondly,
the relation ≈ in (70) is defined by an existential quantification, so that the generating
lattice A+/ ≈ – and hence by (70) also LA – is preserved under inverse images of geometric
morphisms. This proves Lemma 22. 
Combining Lemma 22 with Lemma 21, we obtain (71) and hence Theorem 20. 
For later we use, we put an important property of LA on record.
Definition 23 A distributive lattice is normal if for all b1, b2 such that b1 ∨ b2 = ⊤ there
are c1, c2 such that c1 ∧ c2 = ⊥ and c1 ∨ b1 = ⊤ and c2 ∨ b2 = ⊤. A distributive lattice is
called strongly normal if for all a, b there exist x, y such that a 6 b ∨ x and b 6 a ∨ y and
x ∧ y = ⊥.
Lemma 24 The lattice LA is strongly normal, and hence normal.
26Further to our remarks in Subsection 1.4 on geometric propositional logic, we recall that a geometric
predicate logic is a theory whose formulae are as described there (where the atomic formulae may now
involve relations and equalities and all the usual structures allowed in first-order logic as well), now also
involving finitely many free variables x = (x1, . . . , xn), and the existential quantifier ∃, with axioms taking
the form ∀x : ϕ(x)→ ψ(x). Geometric formulae form an important class of logical formulae, because they
are precisely the ones whose truth value is preserved by inverse images of geometric morphisms between
topoi. From their syntactic form alone, it follows that their interpretation in the external language is
determined locally.
27This lemma is, in fact, valid for any topos E replacing Sets; Johnstone’s proof just relies on the fact that
the functor evC : E
C → E that evaluates at C ∈ C is (the inverse image part of) a geometric morphism.
The stated generalization follows because the functor (evC)∗ : E → E
C given by (evC)∗(S) = S
C(−,C)
determines the direct image part [63, Exercise VII.10.1].
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This lemma is due to Coquand [26, Thm. 1.11], but we give a proof.
Proof First, every strongly normal lattice is normal. To prove this, let b1 ∨ b2 = ⊤ and
choose x, y such that b1 6 b2 ∨ x, b2 6 b1 ∨ y, and x ∧ y = ⊥. Then ⊤ 6 b1 ∨ b2 6
(b2 ∨ x) ∨ b2 = b2 ∨ x. Similarly, ⊤ = b1 ∨ y.
Second, to check that LA is strongly normal, it is enough to verify the defining property
on the generators Da. So we pick a, b in Asa. Then one has Da 6 Da−b ∨ Db, Db 6 Db−a ∨ Da,
and Da−b ∧ Db−a = ⊥. 
We now turn to the relation (23), which is to be imposed on LA. It turns out that (23)
is a special case of a relation that can be defined on any distributive lattice L by x ≪ y
iff there exists z such that x ∧ z = ⊥ and y ∨ z = ⊤.28
Lemma 25 For all Da, Db ∈ LA, the following are equivalent:
29
1. There exists Dc ∈ LA such that Dc ∨ Da = ⊤ and Dc ∧ Db = ⊥;
2. There exists q > 0 such that Db 6 Da−q.
Proof 1 ⇒ 2: By [26, Cor 1.7] there exists q > 0 such that Dc−q ∨ Da−q = ⊤. Hence
Dc ∨ Da−q = ⊤, so Db = Db ∧ (Dc ∨ Da−q) = Db ∧ Da−q 6 Da−q.
2⇒ 1: Choose Dc := Dq−a. 
Hence in what follows we write
Db ≪ Da iff ∃q>0 Db 6 Da−q, (72)
and note with Coquand [26] that in view of the above lemma the relation (23) just states
that the frame O(Σ) is regular.30 This leads to the following description.
For any distributive lattice L, an ideal I ∈ Idl(L) is called regular if I ⊇
։
x implies
x ∈ I, where
։
x = {y ∈ L | y ≪ x}. (73)
Expressed in logical language, I is therefore a regular ideal if
∀y∈L (y ≪ x⇒ y ∈ I)⇒ x ∈ I, (74)
and hence one has the frame RIdl(L) of regular ideals of L, defined by
RIdl(L) = {U ∈ Idl(L) | (∀y∈L y ≪ x⇒ y ∈ U)⇒ x ∈ U}; (75)
for the sake of completeness, U ∈ Idl(L) as a predicate on P(L) stands for ⊥ ≡ 0 ∈ U and
x ∈ U, y 6 x ⇒ y ∈ U ; (76)
x, y ∈ U ⇒ x ∨ y ∈ U. (77)
28Banaschewski and Mulvey write that x is ‘rather below’ y [7], whereas Johnstone [48] says that x is
‘well inside’ y. The notation ≪ is usually reserved for the so-called ‘way below’ relation, but this relation
coincides with the ‘well inside’ relation on compact regular locales (see [48, p.303] and Theorem 27), so we
feel entitled to identify them notationally.
29In what follows, one may take q > 0 either in Q or in R.
30See [48, III.1.1] for this notion. Recall that by the general theory of Banaschewski and Mulvey [7], the
spectrum has to be a compact regular frame.
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Any ideal U ∈ Idl(L) can be turned into a regular ideal AU by means of the closure
operation A : DL→ DL defined by [23]
AU = {x ∈ L | ∀y∈L y ≪ x⇒ y ∈ U}, (78)
and the canonical map f : L→ RIdl(L) is given in terms of (78) by (67).
Combining Theorem 27 in [23] (which states that the regular ideals in a normal dis-
tributive lattice form a compact regular frame) with Theorem 1.11 in [26] (which applies
this to the case at hand), we finally obtain:
Theorem 26 The Gelfand spectrum O(Σ) of a commutative unital C*-algebra A is iso-
morphic (as a frame) to the frame of all regular ideals of LA, i.e.
O(Σ) ∼= {U ∈ Idl(LA) | (∀Db∈LA Db ≪ Da ⇒ Db ∈ U)⇒ Da ∈ U}. (79)
In this realization, the canonical map f : LA → O(Σ) is given by
f(Da) = {Dc ∈ LA | ∀Db∈LA Db ≪ Dc ⇒ Db 6 Da}. (80)
By construction, we then have
f(Da) 6
∨
{f(Da−q) | q > 0}. (81)
For later use, also note that (80) implies
f(Da) = ⊤ ⇔ Da = ⊤. (82)
We may now equip LA with the covering relation defined by (68), given (79) and the
ensuing map (80).31 Consequently, by Proposition 17 one has
O(Σ) ∼= F(LA,⊳). (83)
This description becomes computable by the following two results.
Theorem 27 In any topos, the covering relation ⊳ on LA defined by (68) with (79) and
(80) is given by Da ⊳ U iff for all q > 0 there exists a (Kuratowski) finite U0 ⊆ U such that
Da−q 6
∨
U0. (If U is directed, this means that there exists Db ∈ U such that Da−q 6 Db.)
Proof The easy part is the “⇐” direction: from (81) and the assumption we have f(Da) 6∨
f(U) and hence Da ⊳ U by definition of the covering relation.
In the opposite direction, assume Da ⊳ U and take some q > 0. From (the proof of)
Lemma 25, Da ∨ Dq−a = ⊤, hence
∨
f(U) ∨ f(Dq−a) = ⊤. Since O(Σ) is compact, there is
a finite U0 ⊂ U for which
∨
f(U0) ∨ f(Dq−a) = ⊤, so that by (82) we have Db ∨ Dq−a = ⊤,
with Db =
∨
U0. By (19) we have Da−q ∧ Dq−a = ⊥, and hence
Da−q = Da−q ∧ ⊤ = Da−q ∧ (Db ∨ Dq−a) = Da−q ∧ Db 6 Db =
∨
U0.

31Alternatively, writing Da ⊳0 U iff U ⊇
։
Da, the covering relation ⊳ is inductively generated by ⊳0, as
explained in [27, 79]. The triple (LA,6,⊳0) is a flat site as defined in [79].
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Thus we have two alternative expressions for the spectrum:
O(Σ) ∼= {U ∈ Idl(LA) | ∀q>0 Da−q ∈ U ⇒ Da ∈ U}, (84)
∼= {U ∈ P(LA) | Da ⊳ U ⇒ Da ∈ U}. (85)
The first follows from (79), the second from (64) and (83).
To apply this to our functor topos T (A), we apply the Kripke–Joyal semantics for the
internal language of the topos T (A) (see [63, §VI.7], whose notation we will use, and [12,
§6.6]) to the statement Da ⊳ U . This is a formula φ with two free variables, namely Da of
type LA, and U of type P(LA) ≡ Ω
LA . Hence in the forcing statement C  φ(α) in T (A),
we have to insert
α ∈ (LA × Ω
LA)(C) ∼= LC × Sub(LA|↑C),
where LA|↑C is the restriction of the functor LA : C(A) → Sets to ↑C ⊂ C(A). Here we
have used (71), as well as the isomorphism [63, §II.8]
ΩLA(C) ∼= Sub(LA|↑C). (86)
Consequently, we have α = (Dc, U ), where Dc ∈ LC for some c ∈ Csa (note the change of
typefont between the formal variable Da and the actual element Dc) and U : ↑C → Sets
is a subfunctor of LA|↑C . In particular, U(D) ⊆ LD is defined whenever D ⊇ C, and the
subfunctor condition on U simply boils down to U(D) ⊆ U(E) whenever C ⊆ D ⊆ E.
Corollary 28 In the topos T (A) the cover ⊳ of Theorem 27 may be computed locally, in
the sense that for any C ∈ C(A), Dc ∈ LC and U ∈ Sub(LA|↑C), one has
C  Da ⊳ U(Dc, U) iff Dc ⊳C U(C),
in that for all q > 0 there exists a finite U0 ⊆ U(C) such that Dc−q 6
∨
U0.
Proof For simplicity, assume that
∨
U0 ∈ U , so that we may replace U0 by Db =
∨
U0;
the general case is analogous. We then have to inductively analyze the formula Da ⊳ U ,
which, under the stated assumption, in view of Theorem 27 may be taken to mean
∀q>0 ∃Db∈LA (Db ∈ U ∧ Da−q 6 Db). (87)
We now infer from the rules for Kripke–Joyal semantics in a functor topos that:32
1. C  (Da ∈ U)(Dc, U) iff for all D ⊇ C one has Dc ∈ U(D); since U(C) ⊆ U(D), this
happens to be the case iff Dc ∈ U(C).
2. C  (Db 6 Da)(Dc′ ,Dc) iff Dc′ 6 Dc in LC .
3. C  (∃Db∈LA Db ∈ U∧Da−q 6 Db)(Dc, U) iff there isDc′ ∈ U(C) such thatDc−q 6 Dc′ .
4. C  (∀q>0 ∃Db∈LA Db ∈ U ∧ Da−q 6 Db)(Dc, U) iff for all D ⊇ C and all q > 0 there
is Dd ∈ U(D) such that Dc−q 6 Dd, where Dc ∈ LC is seen as an element of LD
through the injection LC →֒ LD of Theorem 20, and U ∈ Sub(LA|↑C) is seen as an
element of Sub(LA|↑D) by restriction. This, however, is true at all D ⊇ C iff it is
true at C, because U(C) ⊆ U(D) and hence one can take Dd = Dc′ for the Dc′ ∈ LC
that makes the condition true at C. 
32The first one follows from [12, Prop. 6.6.10] and a routine computation. The others are obvious from
either [63, §VI.7] or [12, §6.6].
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This brings us to our recipe for computing the spectrum in T (A) locally:
Theorem 29 The spectrum O(Σ) of A in T (A) can be computed as follows:
1. At C ∈ C(A), the set O(Σ)(C) consists of those subfunctors U ∈ Sub(LA|↑C) such
that for all D ⊇ C and all Dd ∈ LD one has Dd ⊳D U(D)⇒ Dd ∈ U(D).
2. In particular, at C ·1, the set O(Σ)(C ·1) consists of those subfunctors U ∈ Sub(LA)
such that for all C ∈ C(A) and all Dc ∈ LC one has Dc ⊳C U(C)⇒ Dc ∈ U(C).
3. The condition that U = {U (C) ⊆ LC}C∈C(A) be a subfunctor of LA comes down to
the requirement that U(C) ⊆ U(D) whenever C ⊆ D.
4. The map O(Σ)(C)→ O(Σ)(D) given by the functoriality of O(Σ) whenever C ⊆ D
is given by truncating an element U :↑C → Sets of O(Σ)(C) to ↑D.
5. The external description of O(Σ) is the frame map
π∗Σ : O(C(A))→ O(Σ)(C · 1), (88)
given on the basic opens ↑D ∈ O(C(A)) by
π∗Σ(↑D) = χ↑D : E 7→ ⊤ (E ⊇ D);
E 7→ ⊥ (E + D), (89)
where the top and bottom elements ⊤,⊥ at E are given by {LE} and ∅, respectively.
Proof By (85), O(Σ) is the subobject of ΩLA defined by the formula φ given by
∀Da∈LA Da ⊳ U ⇒ Da ∈ U, (90)
whose interpretation in T (A) is an arrow from ΩLA to Ω. In view of (86), we may
identify an element U ∈ O(Σ)(C) with a subfunctor of LA|↑C , and by (90) and Kripke–
Joyal semantics in functor topoi (see, in particular, [63, §IV.7]), we have U ∈ O(Σ)(C) iff
C  φ(U ), with φ given by (90). UnfoldiIng this using the rules for Kripke–Joyal semantics
and using Corollary 28 (including part 1 of its proof), we find that U ∈ O(Σ)(C) iff
∀D⊇C ∀Dd∈LD ∀E⊇DDd ⊳E U(E)⇒ Dd ∈ U(E), (91)
where Dd is regarded as an element of LE. This condition, however, is equivalent to the
apparently weaker condition
∀D⊇C ∀Dd∈LD Dd ⊳D U(D)⇒ Dd ∈ U(D); (92)
condition (91) clearly implies (92), but the latter applied at D = E actually implies the
first, since Dd ∈ LD also lies in LE.
Items 2 to 4 are now obvious, and the last follows by the explicit prescription for the
external description of frames recalled in in Subsection 1.7. Note that each O(Σ)(C) is a
frame in Sets, inheriting the frame structure of the ambient frame Sub(LA|↑C). 
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An equivalent way to compute the spectrum, which derives from (84) rather than
(85), is as follows: O(Σ)(C · 1) (and similarly all the other O(Σ)(C)) consists of those
subfunctors U ∈ Sub(LA) such that for all C ∈ C(A), U(C) is a regular ideal in LC .
To prove this, according to (84) the formula expressing that U ∈ P(LA) be a regular
ideal is
U ∈ Idl(L) ∧ ∀Da∈LA ∀q>0 Da−q ∈ U ⇒ Da ∈ U, (93)
where the condition U ∈ Idl(L) is spelled out in (76) and (77). The locality of this
first condition and of the conjunction in (93) being almost trivial, we concentrate on the
second term, calling it φ as usual. We then find that C · 1  φ(U ) iff for all C ∈ C(A),
all Dc ∈ U(C), and all D ⊇ C one has: if Dc−q ∈ U(E) for all q > 0 at all E ⊇ D, then
Dc ∈ U(D). Now the antecedent automatically holds at all E ⊇ D iff it holds at D, and
similarly the if . . . then statement holds at all D ⊇ C if it holds at C.
A.2 Daseinisation map
Our next aim is to construct the Daseinisation map (44), which, read as a frame map, for
fixed a ∈ Asa is
δ(a)−1 : O(IR)→ O(Σ). (94)
We will use the realization (83) of the spectrum O(Σ) of A as the frame F(LA,⊳) defined
in the preceding subsection. The second frame we deal with is that of the interval domain
O(IR), cf. Subsection 5.1. Following [69], we construct the interval domain as a frame
F(Q×<Q,◭) defined by a covering relation. Here the pertinent meet semilattice Q×<Q
consists of pairs (p, q) ∈ Q × Q with p < q, ordered by inclusion (i.e. (p, q) 6 (p′, q′) iff
p′ 6 p and q 6 q′), with a bottom element ⊥ added. The covering relation ◭ is defined
by ⊥◭U for all U and (p, q)◭U iff for all rational p′, q′ with p < p′ < q′ < q there exists
(p′′, q′′) ∈ U with (p′, q′) 6 (p′′, q′′). In Sets one easily verifies the frame isomorphism
F(Q×< Q,◭) ∼= O(IR), (95)
so that, in particular, we may regard O(IR) as a subset of the power set P(Q ×< Q).
Proposition 30 The functor O(IR) internalizing the interval domain in T (A) is given
by
O(IR) ∼= F(Q×< Q,◭). (96)
Explicitly, we have
O(IR)(C · 1) ∼= {S ∈ Sub(Q×< Q) | S(C) ∈ O(IR) for all C ∈ C(A)}, (97)
where O(IR) ⊂ P(Q×<Q) through (95), as just explained. Furthermore, O(IR)(C) is the
truncation of (97) to ↑C (cf. Theorem 29), and the functorial map O(IR)(C)→ O(IR)(D)
whenever C ⊆ D is given by truncation. Finally, the external description of O(IR) is given
by the frame map
π∗IR : O(C(A))→ O(IR)(C · 1), (98)
where π∗IR is given by a formula similar to (89).
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Proof This follows from a computation analogous to but simpler than the proof of The-
orem 29, combined with the remark following (47) and the observation that the condition
that S : C(A) → P(Q ×< Q) in the right-hand side of (97) be a subfunctor of Q×< Q
means that we may identify S with a monotone function from C(A) to O(IR). 
We now give the external description
δ(a)−1 : O(IR)(C · 1)→ O(Σ)(C · 1) (99)
of our Daseinisation map (94). In view of (83) and (96), we will define (99) as a frame
map
δ(a)−1 : F(Q ×< Q,◭)(C · 1)→ F(LA,⊳)(C · 1). (100)
Internalizing Proposition 19 to T (A), we proceed by constructing a continuous map
d(a) : (LA,⊳)→ (Q×< Q,◭), (101)
for in that case we may put
δ(a)−1 = F(d(a))(C · 1). (102)
By definition, as a map in the functor topos T (A) the continuous map d(a) is a natural
transformation
d(a)∗ : Q×< Q→ P(LA) = Ω
LA (103)
with components d(a)∗C : Q×< Q(C) → Ω
LA(C). One has Q×< Q(C) ∼= Q ×< Q, so by
(86) the d(a)∗C are maps
d(a)∗C : Q×< Q→ Sub(LA|↑C). (104)
By naturality, d(a)∗C is determined by d(a)
∗
C·1 : Q×< Q→ Sub(LA) as
d(a)∗C(r, s)(D) = d(a)
∗
C·1(r, s)(D), (105)
for all D ⊇ C, so d(a)∗ is determined by d(a)∗C·1. Using the description of the lattice
LA(C) by Theorem 20, we may now define
d(a)∗C·1(r, s) : C 7→ {Df−r ∧Ds−g | f, g ∈ Csa, f 6 a 6 g}, (106)
which is indeed a subset of LA(C) = LC , as required.
Lemma 31 The map (101) defined by (103), (105) and (106) is continuous (in the sense
of Definition 18, internalized to T (A)).
Proof First, we claim that d is continuous iff each d(a)C is. Indeed, with regard to the
first condition in Definition 18 this is obvious; for the second cf. [63, Prop. I.8.5], and
for the third this is true because both covering relations are described locally in C (cf.
Corollary 28). By Proposition 19, continuity of d, in turn, would mean that (100) is well
defined as a frame map.
Thus what remains is to verify that each map d(a)C is continuous in the sense of
Definition 18. This is indeed the case; we spare the readers the details.33 
33These will appear in the PhD Thesis of the first author.
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We now compute the associated frame map (100). The map (103) induces a map
Sub(Q×< Q) → Sub(Ω
LA) as the left adjoint of the pullback in the opposite direction
(see, e.g., [63, Exercise I.10]), which by composition with ∪ yields a map Sub(Q ×< Q)→
Sub(LA). The latter restricts to a map F(Q×< Q,◭)(C · 1)→ F(LA,⊳)(C · 1), which by
definition is the map (100) and hence gives the external description (99) of our Daseinisa-
tion map.34 This is a frame map by construction; see Lemma (31) and Proposition (19).
The associated locale map δ(a) : Σ→ IR is our version of the Do¨ring–Isham Daseinisation
map. It is unenlightening to write it down explicitly, but we give an appealing special case
in Subsection 5.2.
A.3 Localization of integrals
Finally, to compute the interpretation of the locale of integrals we may proceed analo-
gously to the case of the spectrum. The free distributive lattice satisfying the relations
in Section 4.2 may alternatively be defined by an entailment relation [23]. Consequently,
it suffices to describe when ∧A ⊢ ∨B in the lattice. As proved in [26, 29], this holds if a
positive combination of elements in A is below a positive combination of elements in B - in
symbols, if there are ri, sj > 0 and ai in A and bj in B such that
∑
riai 6
∑
sjbj . This is
an existential quantification over finite subsets of an f-algebra. The construction of taking
the (Kuratowski) finite powerset is geometric, see e.g. [80]. So existential quantification
over it is preserved by geometric morphisms. Applying this to the internal C*-algebra and
applying Lemma 21 we obtain (cf. Theorem 20):
Proposition 32 The interpretation of the lattice generating the locale of integrals of the
internal C*-algebra is given by the functor assigning to each commutative subalgebra C
the lattice generating the integrals on C. If C ⊆ D, then the inclusion maps generators of
the lattice for C to generators of the lattice for D and preserves relations. The covering
relation for the space of integrals is also interpreted locally.
A similar statement holds for valuations; see [81, 29]. Vickers [78] uses a presentation
of locales which is similar to formal topology, but which is tailored for geometric reasoning.
B Related work
The present article was to a considerable extent motivated by the fundamental work of
Butterfield and Isham [20, 21] and Do¨ring and Isham [33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. We refrain from
a full comparison, but restrict ourselves to what we see as the key points.
As to Butterfield and Isham, our reformulation of the Kochen–Specker Theorem is in
their spirit, but we feel our version is more powerful, especially from a logical perspective:
our statement that a certain locale has no points has a logical interpretation in terms of
(the lack of) models of a certain geometric theory, whereas the original reformulation [20]
merely claims that some presheaf lacks global sections (i.e. points).
Compared with Do¨ring and Isham, our overall programme and philosophy, as explained
in the Introduction, are quite different from theirs: our ambitions are limited to finding a
34According to (69), this map is just the component of F(d(a)) at C · 1. This component, however,
determines F(d(a)) as a whole, since F(d(a))(C) is just the restriction of F(d(a))(C · 1) to the truncation
of each subfunctor S in (97) to ↑C.
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spatial notion of quantum logic (although we do hope that locales in topoi might provide
a generalized concept of space that will be useful in quantum gravity). The principal
technical differences between the two approaches lie in our use of:
1. covariant functors (instead of contravariant ones);
2. C*-algebras (instead of von Neumann algebras);
3. locales (instead of Stone spaces);
4. internal reasoning and the associated use of Kripke–Joyal semantics;
5. states as internal integrals and the correspondence between integrals and valuations
(i.e. measures defined on open sets).35
This has many technical advantages, which has made it possible to obtain our main results
(see Subsection 1.9). Conceptually, the two programs in question overlap to the effect that
the Gelfand spectrum O(Σ) of the Bohrification A of A provides a pointfree realization
of Do¨ring and Isham’s notion of a state object in a topos, whereas the interval domain
O(IR) realizes their quantity object, again in the sense of pointfree topology internalized
to a suitable topos.36 These objects are linked by observables, which define arrows from
the state object to the quantity object. Thus for each a ∈ Asa, our Daseinisation δ(a) :
Σ → IR is an observable in the sense of Do¨ring and Isham. Restricted to the special
case A = B(H), our construction resembles the single example of such a topos that both
Butterfield, Hamilton and Isham [19] and Do¨ring and Isham [34, 35] give, namely that of
presheaves over the preorder category of commutative von Neumann subalgebras of B(H)
(ordered by inclusion).
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